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I
INTRODUCTION
The editors of Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction. An Interlocutory Restatement' posit
that "the present law [on appealability] is unnecessarily and unacceptably com-
plex, uncertain, and sometimes even inscrutable."'2 The Restatement attempts "to
restructure [that law] in a way that might admit of greater simplicity and predict-
ability in application, and thus to suggest an approach to [its] reformation." 3
The following effort to describe the current status of appealability under the
law of North Carolina suggests a similar complexity and uncertainty in this juris-
diction and the consequent desirability of similar efforts at reform. For reasons
hereinafter set forth, however, skepticism as to the prospects for significant reform
is warranted.
An interlocutory order or judgment under North Carolina law is one which
"does not determine the issues but directs some further proceeding preliminary to
final decree. Such an order or judgment is subject to change by the court during
the pendency of the action to meet the exigencies of the case."'4 As a general rule,
there is no right of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders or judgments, and
they may be reviewed only upon appeal from a final judgment. 5 The exceptional
circumstances under which interlocutory orders are immediately appealable, as a
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3. Id For a comparison of the federal and North Carolina approaches to interlocutory appeals, see
Comment, Interlocutog Appeals in North Carohna." The Substantial Right Doctrine, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 857
(1982).
4. Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 693, 120 S.E.2d 82, 91 (1961); accord
Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 207, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978); Skidmore v. Austin, 261
N.C. 713, 715, 136 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1964).
5. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-278 (1983) ("Upon an appeal from a judgment, the court may review any
intermediate order involving the merits and necessarily affecting the judgment.").
A court, however, may refuse to review an interlocutory order upon appeal from final judgment. See
Ingle v. McCurry, 243 N.C. 65, 66, 89 S.E.2d 745, 746 (1955) (on appeal from final judgment, assignment
of error to interlocutory rulings "from which the plaintiffs gave notice of appeal" held premature, not
affecting a substantial right, and not appealable); First Union Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 60 N.C. App. 781, 782,
300 S.E.2d 19, 20 (1983) (entry of default not subject to review on appeal from final judgment of default).
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matter of right, are determined by statute.6
If an attempted interlocutory appeal does not come within a statutory excep-
tion, the appellate court may dismiss the appeal on its own motion, even if neither
party raises the question of appealability. 7 In extraordinary circumstances, how-
ever, the court may review the merits of the appeal despite the appeal's interlocu-
tory nature." With one exception, 9 the trial court has no authority to make an
order immediately appealable when it is one from which there is no appeal
of right. '0
Appeals of right may be taken from interlocutory orders or judgments which
(1) in effect determine the action and prevent a judgment from which an appeal
might be taken; i" (2) discontinue the action;' 2 (3) grant or refuse a new trial; 13
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-277, IA-1, Rule 54(b) (1983); id. § 7A-27 (1981). In some cases appeal of an
interlocutory order is dismissed on the ground that the appellant is not a "party aggrieved." Only a party
aggrieved by a judgment or order may appeal it. Id § 1-27 1.
In Lucas v. Felder, 261 N.C. 169, 134 S.E.2d 154 (1964), the clerk ordered the sale of realty to pay the
debts of an estate, but did not adjudicate the rights of the parties to the estate's property. The court
dismissed the appeal, saying there could be no party aggrieved until there was an adjudication of the
parties' rights. In Atkins v. Beasley, 53 N.C. App. 33, 37, 279 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1981), although the interloc-
utory judgment affected a substantial right and was in theory appealable, it did not order appellant to do
anything. He therefore was not aggrieved thereby and could not appeal.
Other cases intertwine the definitions of "party aggrieved" and "substantial right," saying, for example,
that a party aggrieved is one whose "rights are substantially affected by judicial order." Coburn v. Roa-
noke Lane & Timber Corp., 260 N.C. 173, 175, 132 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1963). In Coburn the court dismissed
the appeal, concluding that "[slince plaintiffs are estopped to assert title to the land in controversy, it
follows that an order enjoining them from cutting timber which they do not own does not affect any
substantial right of theirs. They are not parties aggrieved." 260 N.C. at 177, 132 S.E.2d at 342; see also
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Parker Motors, Inc., 13 N.C. App. 632, 634, 186 S.E.2d 675, 677 (1972) ("A
party is not aggrieved unless the order complained of affects a substantial right, or in effect determines the
action.") (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277).
7. E.g., Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978).
8. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Raleigh, 240 N.C. 137, 139, 81 S.E.2d 273, 275 (1954) (court chose not
to dismiss the appeal, holding that further hearing by the Industrial Commission would be "inconvenient,
expensive and futile; and it would seem that this court, under the facts of this case . . . should not require
this wholly unnecessary and circuitous course of procedure."); Shoffner Indus., Inc. v. Lloyd Constr. Co., 42
N.C. App. 259, 272, 257 S.E.2d 50, 59 (court chose to examine pleadings in support of and in opposition to
motion for summary judgment even though not appealable "to avoid any confusion about the posture of
the case on remand"), d'scretionary review denid, 298 N.C. 296, 259 S.E.2d 301 (1979); City of Greensboro v.
Irvin, 25 N.C. App. 661, 662, 214 S.E.2d 196, 197 (1975) (court chose to treat premature appeal as a
petition for writ of certiorari and reviewed on the merits).
When the court of appeals chooses to review an otherwise unappealable order, the issue of appealability
is moot on certiorari review in the supreme court. Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 454, 215 S.E.2d 30,
34 (1975) (review of court of appeals was pursuant to supervisory authority conferred by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-32(c) (1981)).
In Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 202 n.2, 240 S.E.2d 338, 340 n.2 (1978), however,
the court of appeals had purported to entertain the case on its merits as an appeal of right and not pur-
suant to § 7A-32(c). The supreme court granted discretionary review and reversed the court of appeals,
holding that it should have dismissed the appeal sua sponte. 294 N.C. at 210, 240 S.E.2d at 344.
9. In a case involving multiple parties or claims, the trial court may create a right of immediate
appeal from an interlocutory judgment that is final as to fewer than all of the parties or claims, by certi-
fying that "there is no just reason for delay." N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 54(b) (1983); see znfta text
accompanying notes 36-44.
10. E.g., Cox v. Cox, 246 N.C. 528, 532, 98 S.E.2d 879, 883 (1957) ("The attempted appeal was a
nullity, notwithstanding the Judge signed the appeal entries appearing of record.").
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (1983); id § 7A-27(d)(2) (1981); see Leach v. Alford, 63 N.C. App.
118, 121, 304 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1983).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (1983); id § 7A-27(d)(3) (1981).
13. Id. §§ 1-277(a), 7A-27(d)(4).
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(4) adversely rule on the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the
defendant;14 (5) are final judgments as to fewer than all claims or parties, and in
which it is determined in the judgment that there is no just reason for delay (com-
monly referred to as Rule 54(b) judgments);' 5 or (6) affect a substantial right.' 6
The current status of appealability under each of these categories is discussed
below. Some of the classifications, such as orders granting or refusing a new trial,
are relatively straightforward and easy to apply. Orders affecting a substantial
right, however, present a disorganized display of case law. The courts have been
extremely flexible in this area, deciding on an almost ad hoc basis whether the
order is appealable as one affecting a substantial right. They appear guided by a
desire to reach an equitable disposition in the individual case rather than by the
coherent application of consistent legal principles.
While that purpose may have merit, these inconsistencies generate large social
costs through needless appeals and delays of trial in an already overtaxed court
system and through the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals or
corporate entities.
Viewed in a broader context, the basic rule for guidance in North Carolina is
that appeal is available whenever an interlocutory order affects a substantial right.
The legislature has not limited the definition of "substantial right." All the other
enumerated categories of appealable orders, except perhaps orders under Rule
54(b) (concerning complex litigation), are collapsible into the category of
"affecting a substantial right." Although the statute recognizes them individually,
it nonetheless leaves the field open for the judiciary to create new categories.
Given the courts' high priority for reaching equitable results, even where tenuous
legal foundation for appeal exists, the number of situations in which interlocutory
appeals are allowed continually expands.
This detailed investigation of the North Carolina case law reveals a judiciary
struggling to reach an equitable and workable definition of the substantial rights
doctrine. This example of the unstructured, perhaps incomprehensible, body of
decision in one state supports the proposition that law revision is worthwhile at the
state as well as the federal level. As a collateral benefit, the study provides a useful
resource to those interested in North Carolina practice. At this point, practitioners
must depend almost exclusively on the courts' various formulations of "substantial
rights" for guidance in the appealability of interlocutory orders.
II
ORDERS IN EFFECT DETERMINING THE ACTION AND PREVENTING AN
APPEALABLE JUDGMENT
Sections 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(2) of the General Statutes grant a right of
immediate appeal from any judicial order or determination "which in effect deter-
14. Id. § 1-277(b).
15. Id § IA-I, Rule 54(b) (1983). All references to "Rules" in the text are to the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure, N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I (1983).
16. Id. §§ 1-2 77 (a), 7A-27(d)(l).
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mines the action, and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be
taken.' 7 This provision is invoked primarily to allow appeals from orders
granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 1218 and allowing summary judgment
under Rule 56.19 Thus, a litigant may seek appellate review where it might other-
wise be unattainable, since there is technically no final judgment.
III
DISCONTINUATION OF ACTION
Sections 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(3) of the General Statutes grant a right of
immediate appeal from any interlocutory order which "discontinues the action. '20
This can perhaps be viewed as a final judgment from which an appeal would
ordinarily lie. Clearly, a right to appeal in this situation protects a litigant's sub-
stantial interest in obtaining access to the appeal process.
IV
NEW TRIAL
Sections 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(4) of the General Statutes grant a right of
immediate appeal from any interlocutory order granting or refusing a new trial.2 1
Although this statutory exception to the nonappealability of interlocutory orders
appears absolute, it has been judicially modified by a rule that the grant of a
partial new trial, limited solely to damages, is not immediately appealable. 22 It is
unclear whether a ruling on a motion for a new trial on both liability and dam-
ages, but on fewer than all claims, is immediately appealable. 23
17. Id §§ 1-277(a), 7A-27(d)(2).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, Rule 12 (1983); see generally North Carolina Consumers Power, Inc. v.
Duke Power Co., 285 N.C. 434, 206 S.E.2d 178 (1974); Acorn v. Jones Knitting Corp., 12 N.C. App. 266,
182 S.E.2d 862, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 511, 183 S.E.2d 686 (1971). For a detailed discussion of cases
involving motions to dismiss, see supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1, Rule 56 (1983); see Noxco Equip. Co. v. Mason, 291 N.C. 145, 229
S.E.2d 278 (1976).
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (1983); id § 7A-27(d)(3) (1981).
21. Id §§ 1-277(a), 7A-27(d)(4).
22. E.g., Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.C. 486, 251 S.E.2d 443 (1979) (order
granting partial summary judgment on liability not appealable when issue of damages reserved for trial),
appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 807 (1980); Uniguard Carolina Ins. Co. v. Dickins, 41 N.C. App. 184, 254 S.E.2d
197 (1979) (expressly overruling Digsby v. Gregory, 35 N.C. App. 59, 61, 240 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1978), on
this point).
23. In Grove v. Baker, 174 N.C. 745, 746, 94 S.E. 528, 529 (1917), the court held that there was a right
of immediate appeal from the grant of a new trial on only one of four issues, on the ground that plaintiffs
had a substantial right to a judgment on the jury's verdict. The grant of the partial new trial was expressly
made "as a matter of law, and not in the exercise of any discretion." Had the grant of the new trial been
discretionary, the court reasoned that the appeal would have been premature.
In Deal Constr. Co. v. Spainhour, 59 N.C. App. 537, 296 S.E.2d 822 (1982), the court dismissed an
appeal from an order setting aside a jury verdict and granting a new trial. The court did not expressly
consider whether a substantial right was affected.
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V
JURISDICTION
Section 1-277(b) of the General Statutes grants the right of immediate appeal
by "[a]ny interested party . . . from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person or property of the defendant. ' 24
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held in Love v. Moore2 5 that section
1-277(b) grants the right of appeal from adverse rulings on motions which attack
the power of the court to bring the defendant before it on minimum contacts
issucs. The court reasoned that the statutory reference to "property" indicates in
rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, and that "person" refers to inpersonam jurisdiction.26
The defendant had moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion 27 on the ground that process and service of process were insufficient.2 8 The
court reasoned that the defendant's motion attacked the technical attempts to
invoke jurisdiction by bringing the defendant before the court, rather than the
court's power to invoke jurisdiction, where that power was properly applied.
Thus, the "true character" of the motion was not based on lack of personal juris-
diction, and it was not appealable under section 1-277(b). 2 9
Interlocutory rulings on motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to the
insufficiency of process and service of process are not immediately appealable
under section 1-277(b), 30 but rulings on motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
over person or property are immediately appealable under that section. 3' Interloc-
utory rulings on motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 32 how-
ever, are not immediately appealable under section 1-277(b). 33
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(b) (1983). As an alternative, "such party may preserve his exception for
determination upon any subsequent appeal in the cause." Id
25. 305 N.C. 575, 291 S.E.2d 141 (1982).
26. Id at 580, 291 S.E.2d at 145-46.
27. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 12(b)(2) (1983).
28. See id. Rule 12(b)(4)-(5).
29. Prior cases in the court of appeals had allowed immediate appeal from the denial of a motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of process and of service of process on the ground that the court would lack per-
sonal jurisdiction if service were insufficient. E.g., Kahan v. Longiotti, 45 N.C. App. 367, 263 S.E.2d 345
(1980). Conlra Broaddus v. Broaddus, 45 N.C. App. 666, 263 S.E.2d 842 (1980) (no appeal from denial of
motion to dismiss temporary child custody order for lack of personal jurisdiction due to failure to serve
with process; court of appeals reasoned that trial court never claimed to have personal jurisdiction over
defendant and children were not his "property").
30. The granting of a motion to dismiss would obviously be immediately appealable as a final judg-
ment if it in effect determined the action or discontinued it. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (1983); id § 7A-
27(d)(2)-(3) (1981). See infra note 33.
31. See Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 327, 293 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1982); Southern Spindle
& Flyer Co. v. Milliken & Co., 53 N.C. App. 785, 786, 281 S.E.2d 734, 735, dscretiona review denied, 304
N.C. 729, 288 S.E.2d 381 (1981); Holt v. Holt, 41 N.C. App. 344, 346, 255 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1979); Hankins
v. Somers, 39 N.C. App. 617, 618, 251 S.E.2d 640, 642, discretionary review denied, 297 N.C. 300, 254 S.E.2d
920 (1979).
32. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 12(b)(1) (1983).
33. Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 326-27, 293 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1982) (expressly over-
ruling contrary holdings in Eller v. Coca-Cola Co., 53 N.C. App. 500, 501, 281 S.E.2d 81, 82 (1981), and
Kilby v. Dowdle, 4 N.C. App. 450, 452, 166 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1969); implicitly overruling Journeys Int'l v.
Corbett, 53 N.C. App. 124, 126, 280 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1981)); Shaver v. Monroe Constr. Co., 54 N.C. App. 486,
283 S.E.2d 526 (1981).
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In Teachy v. Cob/e Dairies, Inc. 3 4 the supreme court considered whether a claim of
sovereign immunity in a negligence action is a claim as to which state courts have
no jurisdiction over the person of the state, or whether state courts have no juris-
diction to hear the particular subject matter of tort claims against the state. If
sovereign immunity is a matter of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a ruling on a
motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity is not immediately appeal-
able pursuant to section 1-277(b). If, however, the issue is personal jurisdiction,
such a ruling is appealable under section 1-277(b). The supreme court chose not
to address this issue, leaving unresolved contradictory decisions of the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina,35 and proceeded to review the merits of the appeal.
VI
RULE 54(B) OF THE NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides in perti-
nent part:
(a) Definition. A judgment is either interlocutory or the final determination of the
rights of the parties.
(b) Judgment upon mul/tpel claims or involving multiple partles. When more than one claim
for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counter-claim, crossclaim, or third-
party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter a final judgment as
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only if there is no just reason for
delay and it is so determined in the judgment. Such judgment shall then be subject to
review by appeal or as otherwise provided by these rules or other statutes. In the absence of
entry of such a final judgment, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and shall not then be
subject to review either by appeal or otherwise except as expressly provided by these rules
or other statutes. Similarly, in the absence of entry of such a final judgment, any order or
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudi-
cating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
3 6
Rule 54(b) affects the appealability of interlocutory orders in two ways. First,
it allows a trial judge to authorize an appeal from a judgment that is final37 as to
Note, however, that the granting of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is immedi-
ately appealable under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-277(a) (1983) and 7A-27(d)(2)-(3) (1981), when it determines
or discontinues the action. See Teachy, 306 N.C. at 327, 293 S.E.2d at 183. If the motion to dismiss were
granted regarding fewer than all the claims or parties, appealability would be determined by whether the
trial judge made a Rule 54(b) determination, or a substantial right was affected thereby. See Farr v. Bab-
cock Lumber Co., 182 N.C. 725, 109 S.E. 833 (1921) (motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion granted regarding one of four claims and trial ordered for remaining three; appeal from dismissal of
claim denied because no substantial right affected).
34. 306 N.C. 324, 293 S.E.2d 182.
35. The court of appeals held in Teachy, 54 N.C. App. 688, 284 S.E.2d 332 (1981), that sovereign
immunity was a question of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal, relying on Shaver v.
Monroe Constr. Co., 54 N.C. App. 486, 283 S.E.2d 526 (1981). Contrary results were reached in Huyck
Corp. v. Mangum, Inc., 58 N.C. App. 532, 293 S.E.2d 846 (1982); Stahl-Rider, Inc. v. State, 48 N.C. App.
380, 269 S.E.2d 217 (1980); and Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hosp., 22 N.C. App. 117, 205 S.E.2d 784
(1974), modifed, 287 N.C. 14, 213 S.E.2d 297 (1975).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 54(a)-(b) (1983). (This rule is modeled on FED. R. Civ. P. 54.).
37. An otherwise effective determination of appealability by the trial judge will not entitle a party to
appeal a judgment that is not final. See Cook v. Export Leaf Tobacco Co., 47 N.C. App. 187, 189, 266
S.E.2d 754, 756 (1980) (summary judgment requiring plaintiff to indemnify defendant for any judgments
arising from incident in regard to which plaintiff's cause was filed was not final since defendant had not yet
been held liable to plaintiff); see also Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.C. 486, 491, 251
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fewer than all the claims or parties38 by determining in the judgment that there is
"no just reason for delay."'39 Whether the trial judge must use the precise language
of the rule in identifying the judgment as immediately appealable is unclear.4"
The judge's mere signing of the appeal entry is probably not, however, a sufficient
determination of appealability under Rule 54(b). 4 1
Second, absent a determination of appealability by the trial judge, the rule
provides for no immediate appeal from any adjudication of fewer than all the
claims or the rights of fewer than all the parties, "except as expressly provided by
these rules or other statutes. ' 42 The supreme court has held that this reference to
"other statutes" refers in particular to sections 1-277 and 7A-27(d) of the General
Statutes. 43 Rule 54(b) thus in no way restricts the right of appeal provided by
other statutes, but actually expands it by allowing the trial judge to create an
appealable interlocutory judgment in limited circumstances. 44
Vii
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS
Sections 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(1) of the General Statutes grant a right of
immediate appeal from any interlocutory order which affects a substantial right.
45
S.E.2d 443, 447 (1979) ("[A] trial judge [cannot] by denominating his decree a 'final judgment' make it
immediately appealable under Rule 54(b) if it is not such a judgment.").
38. "In a case involving only two parties,. . . it is important in applying Rule 54(b) to distinguish the
true multiple claim case from the case in which only a single claim based on a single factual occurrence is
asserted but in which various kinds of remedies may be sought." Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. American Mut. Ins.
Co., 296 N.C. 486, 490, 251 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1979).
39. See, e.g., Harris v. Jim Stacy Racing, Inc., 53 N.C. App. 597, 598, 281 S.E.2d 455, 456-57 (order
provided "no just reason for delay" regarding claims of defendant against certain named parties, but
denied plaintiffs motion pending final determination of plaintiff's claims and defendant's counterclaims),
discretionaiy review dened, 304 N.C. 726, 287 S.E.2d 900 (1981); Wilkerson Contracting Co. v. Rowland, 29
N.C. App. 722, 724, 225 S.E.2d 840, 842 (grant of motion for judgment on the pleadings disposed of fewer
than all claims, but judge stated "no just reason for delay"), discretlwnaiy review denied, 290 N.C. 660, 228
S.E.2d 452 (1976).
40. SeeCook v. Export Leaf Tobacco Co., 47 N.C. App. 187, 189, 266 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1980) (dictum
that trial court's finding that plaintiff "shall be entitled to appeal this judgment" might comply with Rule
54(b)).
41. See Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C. App. 162, 171-72, 265 S.E.2d 240, 247 (1980). But
seeOestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 129, 225 S.E.2d 797, 804-05 (1976) (dictum that the
omission of a finding that "there is no just reason for delay" by the trial judge in the judgment "could have
very well been an inadvertence," and that the judge "certainly intended that plaintiff be permitted to
appeal, or otherwise he would not have entered the appeal entries on account of the language of Rule 54(b)
and would have required plaintiff to seek certiorari").
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1, Rule 54(b) (1983).
43. Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 131, 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (1976). See supra text
accompanying notes 11-23. After the enactment of Rule 54(b), see Act to Amend the Laws Relating to
Civil Procedure, ch. 954, sec. 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1274, 1326-27 (codified at N.C. GEkN. STAT. § IA-I,
Rule 54(b) (1983)), and before Oestreicher, the court of appeals had construed Rule 54(b) to allow appeals
pursuant to the exceptions provided by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-277, 7A-27(d) only where the judge finds "no
just reason for delay." See Arnold v. Howard, 24 N.C. App. 255, 210 S.E.2d 492 (1974) (first court of
appeals case to hold § 1-277 not to be an express authorization of appeal referred to by Rule 54(b)); see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.12(c) (1983) (granting right of immediate appeal from grant of stay to permit
foreign trial; if stay denied, movant must seek certiorari review or waive error).
44. See Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 144, 225 S.E.2d 797, 813 (1976) (Sharp, C.
J., concurring and dissenting).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (1983); id § 7A-27(d)(l) (1981).
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No other statutory ground for interlocutory appeals has been subject to such
extensive judicial interpretation.
The language of section 1-277(a) has been part of the statutory law of North
Carolina without amendment since 1868.46 In 1883 the supreme court noted that
"[n]o rule has yet been settled classifying [cases in which postponement of the
appeal until final judgment would result in absolute loss of, or unavoidable preju-
dice to, the substantial right], and perhaps it would be unwise to undertake to
settle a rule definitely at this time."'47 A century later, the court still has not
"settle[d] a rule" for classifying substantial rights. The supreme court recently
stated:
Admittedly the "substantial right" test for appealability of interlocutory orders is more
easily stated than applied. It is usually necessary to resolve the question in each case by
considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order
from which appeal is sought was entered.4 8
One consideration repeatedly emphasized by the appellate courts is that the
order affecting a substantial right must be such that it will work injury to the
appellant if not corrected before appeal from final judgment. 49 In addition, the
right must be intrinsically substantial, irrespective of whether it will be lost or
prejudiced absent immediate appeal.
Rarely have the North Carolina courts addressed this requirement expressly.
Usually the courts merely state that a right is or is not substantial. The supreme
court has, however, quoted with approval the following definition of a "substantial
right": "a legal right affecting or involving a matter of substance as distinguished
from matters of form: a right materially affecting those interests which a man is
entitled to have preserved and protected by law: a material right. '50
Enhanced understanding of when an interlocutory order affects a substantial
right requires a survey of the case law. 5' This extensive survey shows that rather
46. Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 126, 225 S.E.2d 797, 803 (1976).
47. Jones v. Call, 89 N.C. 188, 190 (1883) (per curiam).
48. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978).
49. Eg., Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 124-25, 225 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1976);
Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 453, 215 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1975).
50. Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 130, 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (1976) (quoting
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1971)); see also Setzer v. Annas, 21 N.C. App.
632, 634, 205 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1974) ("substantial" means "of real worth and importance [or] of consider-
able value" (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)); "substantial" is intended "as a roadblock to
trivial appeals"), rev'd on other grounds, 286 N.C. 534, 212 S.E.2d 154 (1974).
51. Occasionally the courts have confused the limited review of discretionary orders with the appeala-
bility of such orders. That an interlocutory order is within the discretion of the trial judge, and hence
reviewable only for abuse of discretion, does not determine whether a substantial right is affected thereby;
opinions which fail to distinguish these issues should be read critically. See, e.g., Veazey v. City of Durham,
231 N.C. 354, 57 S.E.2d 375 (1950) (since judge had discretion whether to order compulsory reference,
order refusing reference did not affect a substantial right; see nfria note 146); Leonard v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 57 N.C. App. 553, 291 S.E.2d 828 (court appeared to give lack of substantial right and discre-
tionary character of order as alternative bases for nonappealability; see uhfia note 76 and accompanying
text), discretwnary review denied, 306 N.C. 558, 294 S.E.2d 371 (1982); Henredon Furniture Indus., Inc. v.
Southern Ry., 27 N.C. App. 331, 219 S.E.2d 238 (discretionary nature of order and lack of substantial right
not clearly distinguished), discretionary review denied, 289 N.C. 298, 222 S.E.2d 697 (1975); see also Parrish v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 221 N.C. 292, 20 S.E.2d 299 (1942) (not necessary to consider whether substan-
tial right is affected when ruling is on motion not addressed to court's discretion, since motion made as
matter of right is immediately appealable). The court's reasoning in Parrish was akin to that used to
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than uniformly applying definite rules, the courts use an elastic judicial construc-
tion to meet individual needs. For convenience of reference, the subject matter
groupings of cases are set forth alphabetically, with a final category for miscellany.
A. Additional Parties
North Carolina courts generally have not allowed immediate appeal from the
grant or denial of motions involving additional parties. 52
determine when a ruling on a motion for change of venue affects a substantial right. See zn/ia notes 193-94
and accompanying text.
52. E.g., Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N.C. 157, 72 S.E,2d 231 (1952) (joinder of additional party; court
recognized general rule of nonappealability, but nevertheless chose to review merits); City of Shelby v.
Lackey, 235 N.C. 343, 69 S.E.2d 607 (1952) (per curiam) (when plaintiff city sued to enforce zoning ordi-
nance and restrain defendants from continuing to use residential lot for business purposes, adjacent prop-
erty owners allowed to become parties plaintiff; no substantial right of defendants' affected thereby);
Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 67 S.E.2d 669 (1951) (intervention by party claiming interest in land
sought to be condemned; no substantial right lost because no determination of validity of claim); Order of
Masons v. Order of Masons, 225 N.C. 561, 35 S.E.2d 613 (1945) (per curiam) (order allowing additional
parties plaintiff); Lane v. Richardson, 101 N.C. 181, 7 S.E. 710 (1888) (in plaintiff's action to recover
balance due on note, payee on note allowed to become additional defendant and give answer supporting
plaintiff; no substantial right of payor-defendant-appellant affected); Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v.
Murray, 61 N.C. App. 569, 300 S.E.2d 888 (1983) (denial of motion to add third-party defendant as neces-
sary defendant); Wood v. City of Fayetteville, 35 N.C. App. 738, 242 S.E.2d 640 (intervention of additional
defendant; court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the order resulted in their having to defend the consti-
tutionality of a statutory section, since the original defendants raised this issue as a defense and, in any
event, no right relating thereto would be lost if not reviewed before final judgment), dscretionary review
demed, 295 N.C. 264, 245 S.E.2d 781 (1978); Guy v. Guy, 27 N.C. App. 343, 219 S.E.2d 291 (1975) (joinder
of banks holding savings accounts of defendant husband in which plaintiff wife might have an interest);
Henredon Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Southern Ry., 27 N.C. App. 331, 219 S.E.2d 238 (order finding insurer
was proper but not necessary party and denying defendant's motion to join the insurance company; the
court appeared to confuse limited review of discretionary matters with appealability, see supra note 51, but,
in any event, concluded no substantial right was affected), dlscretionary review denied, 289 N.C. 298, 222
S.E.2d 697 (1975).
Only two decisions have allowed immediate appeal from orders involving additional parties, and
neither turned upon traditional substantial rights analysis.
In Childers v. Powell, 243 N.C. 711, 92 S.E.2d 65 (1956), persons claiming a lien on land prior to
plaintiff's alleged lien were allowed to intervene as parties defendant. Recognizing that this order would
ordinarily not be immediately appealable absent threatened deprivation of a substantial right, the court
held this general rule of interlocutory appeals had no application in this situation. It stated:
In short, there is no controversy in which appellees may intervene. Under the circumstances dis-
closed, the controversy as between intervenors and plaintiff should be litigated in and determined by
independent action between these parties rather than by attempting to engraft a new and live contro-
versy on a moribund action.
Here defendants failed to file answer, thus ignoring the action. There is no issue or controversy
subsisting as between plaintiff and defendants. Whatever judgment may be entered will be by default,
unaffected by any allegations the intervenors may make. It will be determinative only as between the
plaintiff and defendants.
Id. at 713, 92 S.E.2d at 67. The intervenors were held to be proper, but not necessary, parties.
Williams v. Hooks, 200 N.C. 419, 157 S.E. 65 (1931), was an action to appoint a receiver to handle
investments of the deceased, a superior court clerk. Two sureties on bonds filed by the deceased as clerk
were joined as defendants for the sole purpose of providing them with notice of all orders made by the
court. The sureties appealed the refusal of the court to dismiss them. The supreme court held the sureties
were not proper parties since neither had any intrest in the securities which were the subject matter of the
action, and thus thejudgment retaining them was reviewable. Id at 421, 157 S.E. at 66. The court neither
discussed appealability of interlocutory orders nor mentioned substantial rights, and seemed to confuse
appealability with the limited scope of review of discretionary matters.
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B. Amendments to Pleadings
An order allowing a party to amend a pleading is generally held not to affect a
substantial right and is thus not immediately appealable.5 3
An order denying a motion to amend an answer in order to assert additional
affirmative defenses and counterclaims was held to affect a substantial right, how-
ever, where defendants were attempting to assert a compulsory counterclaim,
because "failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim will ordinarily bar future
action on the claim."'54 On the other hand, denials of motions to amend to assert a
statute of frauds defense 55 and to allege punitive damages56 have been held to be
not immediately appealable.
C. Attachment
Refusal to dismiss a warrant of attachment has been held immediately appeal-
able.5 7 On the other hand, an order dissolving an attachment on some, but not all,
property and calling for a jury to decide whether any damages resulted therefrom
was held not to affect a substantial right. 58
An order under the Uniform Commercial Code that plaintiffs have immediate
possession of collateral described in previously issued orders of attachment did not
affect a substantial right and was not immediately appealable. 59
D. Condemnation
Section 136-108 of the General Statutes mandates that in highway condemna-
tion proceedings all issues other than damages, including the question of the area
to be taken, shall be determined by a judge upon motion. 60 Section 136-1 19 pro-
vides that either party to such actions has a right of appeal for errors of law in the
same manner as in any other civil actions.
6 1
In Highway Commission v. Nuck/le 62 the supreme court concluded from these stat-
utory sections that an order determining which tracts of land are to be con-
demned, prior to determination of the compensation to be awarded, necessarily
involved a substantial right and was immediately appealable under section
53. E.g., Order of Masons v. Order of Masons, 225 N.C. 561, 562, 35 S.E.2d 613, 613 (1945) (per
curiam) (amendment of complaint); Nissen Co. v. Nissen, 198 N.C. 808, 809, 153 S.E. 450, 450 (1930) (per
curiam) (in appealing order allowing amendment of complaint where no substantial right is affected, '[t]he
defendant attempts to jump over the stile before he gets to it"); Clark v. Clark, 42 N.C. App. 84, 85, 255
S.E.2d 568, 568 (1979) (denial of motion to strike amended complaint on grounds that defendant had no
notice of hearing on motion to amend and no chance to be heard).
54. Hudspeth v. Bunzey, 35 N.C. App. 231, 233, 241 S.E.2d 119, 121, dlsrettonagy review denied, 294
N.C. 736, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978).
55. Buchanan v. Rose, 59 N.C. App. 351, 296 S.E.2d 508 (1982).
56. Lazenby v. Godwin, 49 N.C. App. 300, 271 S.E.2d 69 (1980).
57. E.g., Mitchell v. Elizabeth City Lumber Co., 169 N.C. 397, 86 S.E. 343 (1915).
58. Brown & Co. v. Nimocks, 126 N.C. 808, 36 S.E. 278 (1900).
59. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Center, Inc. v. Stallings 601 Sales, Inc., 49 N.C. App. 187, 270
S.E.2d 567 (1980).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-108 (1981).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-119 (1981).
62. 271 N.C. 1, 155 S.E.2d 772 (1967).
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1-277(a). 63 The court stated:
One of the purposes of G.S. 136-108 is to eliminate from the jury trial any question as to
what land the State Highway Commission is condemning and any question as to its title.
Therefore, should there be a fundamental error in the judgment resolving these vital pre-
liminary issues, ordinary prudence requires an immediate appeal, for that is the proper
method to obtain relief from legal errors. G.S. 1-277.
Obviously, it would be an exercise in futility, completely thwarting the purpose of G.S.
136-108, to have the jury assess damages to tracts 1, 2, 3, and 4 if plaintiff were condemning
only tracts A and B, and the verdict would be set aside on appeal for errors committed by
the judge in determining the "issues other than damages." As Bobbitt, J., said in Light
Companyv. Creasman, 262 N.C. 390, 397, 137 S.E.2d 497, 502, "A controversy as to what land
a condemnor is seeking to condemn has no place in a condemnation proceeding."
6 4
It is difficult to reconcile the appealability of an order determining only what
property has been condemned, leaving the damages issues unresolved, with the
general rule that a judgment on liability only, leaving damages to be determined,
is not immediately appealable. It appears, however, that the state's interest in
condemning property for the benefit of the public, together with the existence of a
comprehensive statutory scheme controlling condemnation, has resulted in a spe-
cial rule of appealability for interlocutory condemnation orders.
E. Contempt
Under current statutory law in North Carolina "[a] person found in civil con-
tempt may appeal in the manner provided for appeals in civil actions. '6 5 Thus,
the appealability of an interlocutory ruling finding civil contempt is governed by
sections 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d). 66
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (1983).
64. Highway Comm'n v. Nuckles, 271 N.C. 1, 14-15, 155 S.E.2d 772, 784 (1967).
Referring to an order determining which lands are to be condemned, the supreme court subsequently
commented on its Nuckles decision as follows: "This . . . is a classic example of an interlocutory order
which affects a substantial right and will work injury to the party aggrieved if not corrected before final
judgment." Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.C. 486, 493, 251 S.E.2d 443, 448 (1979);
see also Moses v. State Highway Comm'n, 261 N.C. 316, 317, 134 S.E.2d 664, 665 (order directing appoint-
ment of commissioners following determination of entitlement to compensation in condemnation pro-
ceeding not appealable of right, but court exercised supervisory capacity to review because "the parties
desire an answer to a question which is fundamental in determining their rights, is also of public impor-
tance, and when decided will aid State agencies in the performance of their duties"), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
930 (1964).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-24 (1981).
Under prior law, no statutes controlled the right of appeal from proceedings "as for contempt," the
predecessor of what is currently called civil contempt. All existing statutory references to "as for contempt"
are deemed to refer to civil contempt under Article 2 of the General Statutes. Id. § 5A-25.
As a consequence, no legal impediment bar[red] a person, who [was] penalized as for contempt, from
obtaining a review of the judgment entered against him in the superior court by a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court. . . . [S]uch right of appeal ha[d] been exercised in proceedings as for contempt
without question for upwards of a hundred years.
Luther v. Luther, 234 N.C. 429, 432, 67 S.E.2d 345, 347 (1951) (court cited long line of North Carolina
precedent allowing immediate appeal from order holding plaintiff "as for contempt"; case decided before
enactment of current civil contempt provisions, see Act of June 23, 1977, ch. 711, § 3(a), 1977 N.C. Sess.
Laws 853, 894-95 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5A-21 to -23 (1981)).
For provisions on appeals from criminal contempt orders, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-17 (1981); id.
§§ 15A-1441 to -1453 (1983).
66. Id. § 1-277(a) (1983); id. § 7A-27(d) (1981).
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In W/lh's v. Duke Power Co.67 the defendant was found in contempt for failure to
comply with a discovery order, but the trial court provided that the defendant
could purge itself by giving the plaintiff certain information within thirty days.
The supreme court noted that without the purge provision the order would be
immediately appealable under then extant statutory and case law regarding crim-
inal contempt appeals. It found that a substantial right would be affected by the
purge provision, which forced defendant either to risk punishment or to comply
with an order it believed erroneous. The court stated:
We hold . . . that when a civil litigant is adjudged to be in contempt for failing to
comply with an earlier discovery order, the contempt proceeding is both civil and criminal
in nature and the order is immediately appealable for the purpose of testing the validity
both of the original discovery order and the contempt order itself where. . . the contemnor
can purge himself. . . only by, in effect, complying with the discovery order of which he
essentially complains.68
In Clark v. Clar/6 9 the trial court found the plaintiff in contempt, but withheld
punishment. The supreme court held that, because the trial court retained the
right to impose punishment in the future, the order holding plaintiff in contempt
affected a substantial right.
70
In Luther v. Luther7 the plaintiff was found punishable "as for contempt," 72 and
was allowed the right of immediate appeal. The court stated, per Justice Ervin:
A party to a proceeding as for contempt undoubtedly waives his right to have the judgment
• . . reviewed on appeal by voluntarily paying the fine imposed upon him by the judgment.
But such is not this case. . . . [P]laintiff paid the fine under protest at the precise moment
she noted her appeal from the order imposing it, and . . .she took this course to avoid
being committed to jail until the fine was paid. Inasmuch as the payment was the product
of coercion, we hold that the plaintiff did not waive her right of appeal by making it. If the
law afforded the plaintiff no way out of her dilemma except that of forfeiting her right of
appeal on the one hand or going to jail on the other, she might well exclaim with the poet:
"Which way I fly is Hell!"' 73
There are no statutory provisions for appeal from the refusal to find contempt,
other than those applying to all interlocutory orders. In Patterson v. Phizlps 4 the
plaintiff's attorney sought to have the defendant's attorney held in criminal con-
tempt, and the plaintiff appealed the court's finding of no contempt. The court of
appeals noted that there are no statutes specifically addressing appeal from an
acquittal of civil or criminal contempt and held that, since the contempt proceed-
ings were held "to vindicate the dignity of the court, ' 75 no substantial right of the
plaintiff was affected.
67. 291 N.C. 19, 229 S.E.2d 191 (1976).
68. Id at 30, 229 S.E.2d at 198; of Midgett v. Crystal Dawn Corp., 58 N.C. App. 734, 736, 294 S.E.2d
386, 387 (1982) (citing Wllis v. Duke Power Co. in allowing appeal from order holding sanctions appropriate
for failure to comply with discovery order, but withholding sanctions pending appeal).
69. 294 N.C. 554, 243 S.E.2d 129 (1978).
70. Id. at 571, 243 S.E.2d at 139.
71. 234 N.C. 429, 67 S.E.2d 345 (1951).
72. See supra note 65.
73. Luther, 234 N.C. at 433, 67 S.E.2d at 348 (quoting J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST, bk. IV, line 75).
74. 56 N.C. App. 454, 289 S.E.2d 48 (1982).
75. Id at 456, 289 S.E.2d at 50.
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In Piedmont Equipment Co. v. Weant 76 a dismissal of a charge of indirect civil
contempt was held to affect a substantial right because the contempt proceedings
were brought as the only method of enforcing a consent judgment.
F. Counsel
In Carringon v. Townes,7 7 the denial of a motion for court-appointed counsel in a
civil paternity action was reviewed by the supreme court "pursuant to G.S.
1-277(a)." 7  Although the court did not comment further on appealability, pre-
sumably the claimed right to counsel is substantial and clearly would be lost were
defendant forced to proceed pro se.
Orders regarding reasonable attorney fees and the permissive withdrawal of
counsel in an action for partition by sale of property held by tenants in common
have been held not immediately appealable. 79
In Leonard v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp.80 the court of appeals considered an order
denying the plaintiff's motion to reconsider a prior order that denied a motion to
allow an out-of-state attorney to appear for the plaintiff. In holding the order not
immediately appealable, the court said:
[W]here the court in its discretion denies a motion for admission of counsel pro hac vice
* . . , such order does not involve a substantial right and is not appealable as a matter of
right. This is so because parties do not have a right to be represented in the courts of North
Carolina by counsel who are not duly licensed to practice in this state. Admission of counsel
in North Carolina pro hac vice is not a right but a discretionary privilege. 8 1
G. Default
A judgment by default which determines all claims and the rights of all parties
is clearly appealable as a final judgment.8 2 An order setting aside an entry or
judgment of default is not appealable under recent case law.8 3 Although some
cases had held such orders appealable of right,8 4 in Bailey v. Goodizg 85 the supreme
76. 30 N.C. App. 191, 226 S.E.2d 688 (1976).
77. 306 N.C. 333, 293 S.E.2d 95 (1982), ceri. denied, 459 U.S. 1113 (1983).
78. Id. at 335, 293 S.E.2d at 97.
79. Rogers v. Brantley, 244 N.C. 744, 94 S.E.2d 896 (1956).
80. 57 N.C. App. 553, 291 S.E.2d 828.
81. Id at 555, 291 S.E.2d at 829. The court appeared to confuse the limited scope of review of discre-
tionary orders with appealability. See supra note 51.
In Holley v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 56 N.C. App. 337, 289 S.E.2d 393 (1982), the court reviewed the
denial of a motion to allow an out-of-state attorney to appear for plaintiff without discussing appealability.
It stated, however, that plaintiff had a fundamental right to counsel of her choice. 56 N.C. App. at 345,
289 S.E.2d at 397. The Leonard court held that Holley was not precedent for the appealability of such an
order since the Holley court did not discuss appealability and relied on precedent that did not apply to the
right to out-of-state counsel. Leonard, 57 N.C. App. at 555, 291 S.E.2d at 830.
82. See, e.g., First Union Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 60 N.C. App. 781, 782-83, 300 S.E.2d 19, 20 (1983).
83. See, e.g., Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 291 S.E.2d 141 (1982) (denial of motion to strike order
vacating default judgment is equivalent of order setting aside default and not appealable of right); Shaw v.
Pedersen, 53 N.C. App. 796, 281 S.E.2d 700 (1981) (order setting aside default judgment); Metcalf v.
Palmer, 46 N.C. App. 622, 265 S.E.2d 484 (1980) ("The right to avoid one trial on the disputed issues is not
normally a substantial right that would allow an interlocutory appeal."); Pioneer Acoustical Co. v. Cisne &
Assocs., 25 N.C. App. 114, 212 S.E.2d 402 (1975) (order setting aside entry of default).
84. Shackleford v. Taylor, 261 N.C. 640, 135 S.E.2d 667 (1964); Davis v. Mitchell, 46 N.C. App. 272,
265 S.E.2d 248 (1980) (recognizing that, although the practice has been criticized, the North Carolina
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court established that no substantial right was affected by the necessity of under-
going a trial on the merits.8 6
H. Discovery
As a general rule, orders denying or allowing discovery are not immediately
appealable of right. The court of appeals has stated:
It has been held that orders denying or allowing discovery are not appealable .... If,
however, the desired discovery would not have delayed trial or have caused the opposing
party any unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or
expense, and if the information desired is highly material to a determination of the critical
question to be resolved in the case, an order denying such discovery does affect a substantial
right and is appealable.
8 7
In the following cases orders declining to compel or prohibiting discovery were
held not immediately appealable: 88
In Dworsky v. Travelers Insurance Co.89 the plaintiffs sought the defendant's entire
file on their claim, with limited exceptions. Because the record failed to show what
material and relevant information might be in the file, the court of appeals charac-
terized the plaintiffs' discovery request as a "fishing expedition," and concluded
that "plaintiffs [had] not shown that the information sought [was] so crucial to the
outcome . . .that it would deprive them of a substantial right . ... 90
In Starmount Co. v. City of Greensboro9 the court of appeals refused to order the
plaintiff to answer certain interrogatories. It held that the information denied the
defendant was not crucial to its defense, and that the defendant had received
answers to other interrogatories giving detailed information regarding all transac-
courts historically have entertained such appeals); Howard v. Williams, 40 N.C. App. 575, 253 S.E.2d 571
(1979).
85. 301 N.C. 205, 270 S.E.2d 431 (1980).
86. The court's rationale expressly followed the approach adopted in Waters v. Qualified Personnel,
Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978). See supra text accompanying note 48. The court held that being
forced to undergo a full trial on the merits instead of a trial solely on damages did not affect a substantial
right. Bailey, 301 N.C. at 210, 270 S.E.2d at 434.
87. Dworsky v. Travelers Ins. Co., 49 N.C. App. 446, 447-48, 271 S.E.2d 522, 523 (1980). Under
former N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 27(b) (1969), deleted by Act ofJune 24, 1975, ch. 762, § 2, 1975 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1040, 1043-44, a potential plaintiff could petition for a deposition to obtain information to
prepare a complaint. Rule 27(b) and its predecessor "generated about one half of all appeals from orders
relating to discovery in North Carolina courts, most of them determined adversely to the party who initi-
ated the procedure." N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 27(b) comment (1983); see In re Mark, 15 N.C. App.
574, 190 S.E.2d 381 (1972) (defendant's appeal from order granting plaintiffs Rule 27(b) petition held not
appealable and not the cause of any substantial harm).
88. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Murray, 61 N.C.
App. 569, 300 S.E.2d 888 (1983) (order granting third-party plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and
denying third-party plaintiffs motions to compel discovery and add necessary party); First Union Nat'l
Bank v. Olive, 42 N.C. App. 574, 257 S.E.2d 100 (1979) (order granting motion to strike certain interroga-
tories and denying defendants' motions to compel answers and to allow a response to plaintiffs request for
admissions); Pack v. Jarvis, 40 N.C. App. 769, 253 S.E.2d 496 (1979) (order sustaining objections to seven-
teen interrogatories to defendants, where trial court expressly said plaintiff was not prohibited from further
proper discovery, without limits); Lundy Packing Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 31 N.C. App. 595,
230 S.E.2d 181 (1976) (denial of request for order requiring defendant to allow plaintiff to inspect and copy
certain documents).
89. 49 N.C. App. 446, 271 S.E.2d 522 (1980).
90. Id. at 448, 271 S.E.2d at 524.
91. 41 N.C. App. 591, 255 S.E.2d 267, dscretzonary review dented, 298 N.C. 300, 259 S.E.2d 915 (1979).
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tions by the plaintiff relevant to the subject of the controversy. The court could
not say that the unanswered interrogatories would provide information the
defendant did not already have.
In the following cases orders compelling discovery were held not immediately
appealable:
In Waldron Buick Co. v. General Motors Corp.92 the trial court denied the
defendant's motion to quash a subpoena duces tecurn summoning an accountant,
hired by defense counsel in connection with the case, to appear and bring evidence
of his analysis of the plaintiff's books and records. The appellants argued that the
subpoena would force disclosure of information given in confidence by counsel for
the defendant. The order specifically excluded such information, however, and
the contents of the books and records were germane to issues at trial.93 The
supreme court held that no substantial right was directly and injuriously affected
by the order and dismissed the appeal. 94
In Ward v. Martin05 the plaintiff filed a complaint and procured an order com-
pelling the defendant to appear before the clerk for a pretrial examination. The
defendant moved to vacate, claiming the privilege against self-incrimination. The
supreme court noted prior decisions "holding that a party cannot appeal from an
order to appear before the clerk to be examined under oath concerning the matters
set out in the pleadings,"9 6 but chose to review the merits of the appeal since the
question of when a party may entirely preclude discovery by claiming the privilege
against self-incrimination was a question "of first importance. '9 7 The court did
not discuss whether the defendant's claim of the privilege was a substantial right
which he might lose if forced to undergo discovery before appeal from final
judgment.
In Casey v. Grtce98 the plaintiff sought damages for criminal conversation and
alienation of affections. The defendant was ordered to answer interrogatories and
submit to an oral deposition regarding his net worth. After the trial court found
that the defendant had been granted valid immunity and could not invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal,
referring to the general rule of nonappealability of discovery orders.99 The court
92. 251 N.C. 201, 110 S.E.2d 870 (1959).
93. In response to defendant's argument that the information sought was privileged work-product, the
court said:
A certified public accountant who has knowledge of the contents of plaintiff's books and records is not
disquaifiedto give evidence in the case "with respect to facts and data obtained by him directly from
the books and records of the plaintiff." Under ... [the] order, this is all [the accountant] is required
to do.
251 N.C. at 206, 110 S.E.2d at 874.
94. Id at 207, 110 S.E.2d at 875; see Cole v. Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 221 N.C. 249, 20 S.E.2d 54
(1942) (order allowing compulsory audit of defendant at defendant's expense does not affect a substantial
right and is not immediately appealable).
95. 175 N.C. 287, 95 S.E. 621 (1918).
96. Id at 289, 95 S.E. at 623.
97. Id at 290, 95 S.E. at 623.
98. 60 N.C. App. 273, 298 S.E.2d 744 (1983).
99. The court cited Dworsky v. Travelers Ins. Co., 49 N.C. App. 446, 447, 271 S.E.2d 522, 523 (1980).
See supra text accompanying note 87 for the language cited by the Casey court.
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did not discuss whether a substantial right was affected under these circumstances.
In the following cases orders affecting discovery were held appealable:
In Tennessee-Carohna Transportation, Inc. v. Strick Corp. oo the trial court prohib-
ited deposition of a metallurgist, who had tested the hardness of the metal used in
allegedly defective trailers. The court based the decision on the fact that a prior
order refused to grant additional discovery time; since the defendant did not know
what the metallurgist's testimony would be, the requested deposition would consti-
tute discovery. The supreme court held that the degree of hardness of the metal
was a "critical question" since that was the very defect in issue. By prohibiting the
deposition, the trial court had precluded the defendant from introducing the test
results and therefore affected a substantial right.
In Lockwood v. McCaskill'0 1 a physician was ordered to submit to a deposition
regarding his examination, diagnosis, and treatment of the plaintiff. With no
express discussion of substantial rights, the supreme court said:
Undoubtedly,. . . [the] order purports to compel [the doctor] to testify concerning matters
which otherwise would be privileged. If and when [he] is required to testify concerning
privileged matters at a deposition hearing, eo iznstane the privilege is destroyed. This fact
precludes dismissal of the appeal as fragmentary and premature. 
10 2
I. Dismissal
The grant of a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss an entire complaint for failure
to state a cause of action is clearly immediately appealable because it "in effect
determines the action.' 10 3
The grant of a 12(b)(6) motion as to fewer than all claims is generally not
immediately appealable.10 4 It has been held, however, that an order sustaining a
100. 291 N.C. 618, 231 S.E.2d 597 (1977). Three justices dissented, for reasons stated in an earlier
opinion, 289 N.C. 587, 223 S.E.2d 346 (1976), which was withdrawn and superseded by this opinion.
101. 261 N.C. 754, 136 S.E.2d 67 (1964).
102. Id. at 757, 136 S.E.2d at 69; see also Yow v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 84 S.E.2d 297 (1954) (court,
without discussing appealability, reviewed merits of appeal from order refusing to permit defendants to
take deposition of doctor who treated plaintiff's injuries; grounds for the court's affirmance seem to be that
communications were statutorily privileged and that the judge lacked authority to enter the order since he
was not the "presiding judge of a Superior Court in term" as required by applicable law).
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, Rule 12(b)(6) (1983).
104. The following cases held that the partial grant of motions to dismiss therein was not immediately
appealable: Teal v. Liles, 183 N.C. 678, 111 S.E. 617 (1922) (per curiam) (demurrer to counterclaim of
defendant for breach of contract sustained); Bacon v. Leatherwood, 52 N.C. App. 587, 279 S.E.2d 86
(1981) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiff's claim against one of two defendants for violation 'of a divorce
judgment, leaving claim for failure to sign deed after signing sales contract and counterclaim of libel
regarding other defendant; no substantial right was affected since plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment
whether deed conveyed good title, and requested declaration implicated neither defendant); Harris v.
DePencier, 52 N.C. App. 161, 278 S.E.2d 759 (1981) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of claims against two corpo-
rate defendants, leaving only one individual defendant; possibility of separate trial on claims against corpo-
rate defendants did not affect a substantial right); Pasour v. Pierce, 46 N.C. App. 636, 265 S.E.2d 652
(1980) (claim dismissed against one of multiple defendants; of limited precedential value because the court,
relying on Arnold v. Howard, 24 N.C. App. 255, 210 S.E.2d 492 (1974), did not consider substantial rights,
see supra note 43); Mozingo v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 27 N.C. App. 196, 218 S.E.2d 506 (1974) (relying
on Arnold. Howara); Durham v. Creech, 25 N.C. App. 721, 214 S.E.2d 612 (1975) (relying on Arnola). Bul
see Wright v. Fiber Indus., Inc., 60 N.C. App. 486, 299 S.E.2d 284 (1983) (review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
of nine of ten claims, without discussing appealability, and holding not appealable the refusal to dismiss
the tenth claim).
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demurrer 0 5 to a plea in bar is immediately appealable. 106
Denial of a motion to dismiss on other than jurisdictional grounds generally
has not been held appealable of right. 0 7
When a motion to strike is directed at an entire answer or complaint, or signifi-
cant portions thereof, so that a grant of the motion is, in effect, a dismissal of the
action, the order granting the motion is treated as a dismissal of the entire action
or as a plea in bar and is immediately appealable. 10 8 "The fragrance of the rose is
105. A demurrer is the equivalent of the current Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94,
98, 176 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1970).
106. Quick v. High Point Mem. Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 450, 452, 152 S.E.2d 527, 528 (1967) (order
striking entire further defense equivalent to sustaining a demurrer, therefore appealable because affects a
substantial right); Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 306, 144 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1965) (orders "in effect" sus-
tained a demurrer to defendant's plea in bar, by holding that defendant's allegations, if true, were insuffi-
cient as a bar to plaintiffs action); Hardin v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 67, 72, 134 S.E.2d 142,
146 (1964) (judgment sustained demurrer to plea in bar to entire action, which plea, if established, would
destroy the cause of action); Housing Auth. v. Wooten, 257 N.C. 358, 363, 126 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1962)
(grant of motion to strike parts of a further answer and defense was in effect a demurrer to the plea in bar,
hence appealable). A "plea in bar" was a pre-Rules of Civil Procedure plea which in practice completely
defeated ("barred") the plaintiff's action.
107. See State ex. rel Edmisten v. Fayetteville St. Christian School, 299 N.C. 351, 261 S.E.2d 908
(denial of motion to dismiss, on grounds statute was unconstitutional as applied to defendants and defend-
ants not subject to statute), aft'don rehearing, 299 N.C. 731, 265 S.E.2d 387, appeal dsmissed, 449 U.S. 807
(1980); North Carolina Consumers Power, Inc. v. Duke Power Co., 285 N.C. 434, 206 S.E.2d 178 (1974)
(court nevertheless reviewed merits; no adverse jurisdictional ruling); Barrier v. Randolph, 260 N.C. 741,
133 S.E.2d 655 (1963) (denial of motion for judgment on pleadings not appealable, but court "express[es]
opinion" on one issue before dismissing); Atkins v. Doub, 260 N.C. 678, 133 S.E.2d 456 (1963) (per curiam)
(refusal of nonsuit); Hollingsworth GMC Trucks, Inc. v. Smith, 249 N.C. 764, 767, 107 S.E.2d 746, 749
(1959) (refusal to nonsuit counterclaim; "[a] litigant has no right to require thejudge to refrain from doing
that which he has a right to do."); Cox v. Cox, 246 N.C. 528, 98 S.E.2d 879 (1957) (order vacating clerk's
judgment of nonsuit had same legal effect as refusal to dismiss, therefore not appealable); Johnson v. Pilot
Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 120, 1 S.E.2d 381 (1939) (refusal to dismiss on ground of statute of limitations bar);
Duffy v. Hartsfield, 180 N.C. 151, 104 S.E. 139 (1920) (dismissal of appeal from refusal of motion for
judgment on the pleadings, after court proceeded to "express an opinion on the merits of the motion, as it
will doubtless prevent further litigation"); Cameron v. Bennett, 110 N.C. 277, 14 S.E. 779 (1892) (refusal of
plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings; "The Court will not take 'two bites at a cherry.' ");
Mitchell v. Kilburn, 74 N.C. 483 (1876) (refusal to dismiss on ground statute governing proceeding was
unconstitutional); Raines v. Thompson, Inc., 62 N.C. App. 752, 303 S.E.2d 413 (1983) (in dismissing the
appeal the court did not discuss the appealability of defendant's claim of absence of personal jurisdiction; it
is not clear whether the refusal to dismiss on that ground was argued on appeal); Dorn v. Dorn, 52 N.C.
App. 370, 278 S.E.2d 281 (1981) (procedural quagmire); Williams v. East Coast Sales, Inc., 50 N.C. App.
565, 274 S.E.2d 276 (1981) (denial of motion to dismiss punitive damages claim); O'Neill v. Southern Nat'l
Bank, 40 N.C. App. 227, 231, 252 S.E.2d 231, 234 (1979) (order denying Rule 12(b)(6) motion not appeal-
able; also, findings made upon request and in support of motion were "merely gratuitous and surplusage,
and [do] not afford grounds for appellate review of an interlocutory order that is otherwise not appeal-
able"); Green v. Best, 9 N.C. App. 599, 176 S.E.2d 853 (1970). But see Munro v. Carolina Rubber Co., 198
N.C. 808, 153 S.E. 412 (1930) (review of order overruling demurrer to complaint without any discussion of
appealability); Joyner v. Champion Fiber Co., 178 N.C. 634, 101 S.E. 373 (1919) (order overruling a
demurrer that is not frivolous is appealable).
108. Davis v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 271 N.C. 405, 408, 156 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1967)
(motion to strike allegations that defendant 'had unnecessarily and fraudulently deprived plaintiffs of their
property two years before it was required for highway purposes, and that plaintiffs were entitled to com-
pensatory and punitive damages for the loss of its use" was equivalent to a "demurrer to that purported
cause of action, and the effect of [the] order allowing the motion was to sustain the demurrer"); Sharpe v.
Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 155 S.E.2d 108 (1967) (motion to strike allegations in complaint of facts showing
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not destroyed by calling it a weed. Nor may what is in fact a demurrer gain
strength or lose vitality by designating it as a motion to strike."' 0 9
J. Family Law
In Stephenson v. Stephenson,t 0 decided in 1981, the court of appeals ruled that
orders and awards pendente lite, although previously occasionally held to involve
a substantial right, would no longer be appealable on that basis. It stated:
"[O]rders and awards pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do
not affect a substantial right from which lies an immediate appeal pursuant to
G.S. 7A-27(d)."' IIThe court held this change in prior practice necessary to avoid
injury, pain and suffering was in effect a demurrer to plaintiff's cause of action for intestate's personal
injuries); Etheridge v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 249 N.C. 367, 106 S.E.2d 560 (1959) (order striking
portion of pleading was in effect a demurrer to the cause of action); Lexington State Bank v. Suburban
Printing Co., 7 N.C. App. 359, 172 S.E.2d 274 (1970) (grant of motion to strike all of defendant's "further
answers and defenses" was "in substance a demurrer"); see also Girard Trust Bank v. Easton, 3 N.C. App.
414, 416, 165 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1969) ("where a motion to strike allegations and a prayer for relief relating
to punitive damages is granted, the order is treated as a demurrer for failure to allege facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action [for the recovery of punitive damages], and an immediate appeal is available");
King v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 273 N.C. 396, 397, 159 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1968) (same).
Dismissal of a punitive damages claim has been held appealable under more recent cases either because
it in effect determined the action, or because there was a substantial right to have the punitive damages
claim tried by the same judge and jury as the remaining claims. See Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores,
290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
The order, to be appealable, must strike not portions of the pleadings that are redundant, irrelevant, or
otherwise improper, but portions that are allegedly legally insufficient to assert a cause of action. King, 273
N.C. at 397, 159 S.E.2d at 893; see also Peoples Oil Co. v. Richardson, 271 N.C. 696, 699-700, 157 S.E.2d369, 372 (1967); Steele v. Moore-Flesher Hauling Co., 160 N.C. 586, 591, 133 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1963);
Williams v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 754, 756, 127 S.E.2d 546, 547-48 (1962).
109. Williams v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 754, 756, 127 S.E.2d 546, 547 (1962).
110. 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981).
Ill. Id at 252, 285 S.E.2d at 282. The court expressly overruled the following cases that had found
substantial rights affected by pendente lite awards in alimony, divorce, and custody cases: Peeler v. Peeler,7 N.C. App. 456, 459, 172 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1970) (award of alimony pendente lite and attorney fees);Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 323, 170 S.E.2d 132, 135 (1969) (order pendente lite granting child
custody, writ of possession to residence, transfer of title to car, alimony and child support, attorney fees,
medical expenses, and money to furnish residence). Musten v. Musten, 36 N.C. App. 618, 244 S.E.2d 699(1978), expressly relied on Peeler, and thus must be viewed as overruled by Stephenson.The following pre-Stephenson cases analyzed particular orders pendente lite and found no substantial
rights involved (although under Stephenson the discussions of substantial rights therein would be super-fluous, they do offer further general guidance as to what the court considers substantial): Bridges v.Bridges, 29 N.C. App. 209, 223 S.E.2d 845 (1976) (order allowing plaintiff-wife to remove certain items ofpersonal property from premises where defendant-husband resided; court found it necessary to review
validity of order, however, in order to review appealable contempt order for failure to comply with order
allowing removal); Guy v. Guy, 27 N.C. App. 343, 348, 219 S.E.2d 291, 295 (1975) (order enjoining with-
drawal of any funds then deposited in savings account of defendant-husband in which plaintiff-wife mighthave interest; court acknowledged only that restraint on use of funds "invokes some discomfort" and "fairplay requires that ownership of the funds be expeditiously and dispositively resolved"; court distinguished
orders affecting subsistence pendente lite and temporary child custody, which before Stephenson could beimmediately appealed); Moore v. Moore, 14 N.C. App. 165, 187 S.E.2d 371 (1972) (order relieving
defendant from alimony and child support pending hearing on changed circumstances where defendant
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depriving parties of the benefits of such orders and awards due to delays occa-
sioned by immediate appeal."
2
In McGinnis V. McGInnisl 13 the trial court issued an order enforcing a New York
decree to the extent of awarding alimony and support arrearages thereunder, and
granted full faith and credit to the alimony and child support provisions of
another New York decree, thus imposing a continuing support obligation on the
defendant. The court of appeals found that this imposition of a continuing sup-
port obligation affected a substantial right. The order was not entered, pending
final determination on the merits, but appeared to be a final adjudication of the
issues of full faith and credit and arrearages. It thus seems that Sephenson, had it
been decided prior to McG'nnis, would not have dictated a conclusion that the
McGznnzs order could not, as a matter of law, involve a substantial right.
In Willhams v. Wi/hams' 14 the parents and child involved in a custody suit were
ordered to submit to psychiatric examinations prior to a final determination of
custody. The court of appeals dismissed the mother's appeal, holding that the
order was interlocutory and did not deprive the appellant of a substantial right.
alleged that plaintiff had the child in Venezuela and refused to arrange visits between defendant and the
child, even though defendant made full and prompt support payments); see also Smart v. Smart, 59 N.C.
App. 533, 297 S.E.2d 135 (1982) (orders awarding temporary custody, restraining defendant from
assaulting plaintiff, awarding exclusive use of marital home to plaintiff, requiring defendant to remove
personal effects from home and to give his keys to police, were all made pending final hearing on merits
and thus, under Sephenson, held not immediately appealable).
112. The court stated:
It is significant that when Peeler was decided, along with Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170
S.E.2d 132 (1969), and other seminal decisions establishing the direct appeal of pendente lite awards
as a matter of right, the situation was different with both the district courts and this Court. At that
time there was insufficient experience with the district courts to know what might be expected.
Indeed, many counties still did not have district courts since the General Court of Justice was not fully
operational until 1971. Moreover, appeal of a pendente lite matter could be heard and an opinion
rendered by this Court within a reasonably short period of time.
Today the situation is quite different. In the majority of appeals from pendente lite awards it is
obvious that a final hearing may be had in the district court and final judgment entered much more
quickly than this Court can review and dispose of the pendente lite order. In this appeal, for instance,
the matter could have been heard on its merits and a final order entered by the District Court in
Hertford County months before the appeal reached this Court for disposition.
There is an inescapable inference drawn from an overwhelming number of appeals involving
pendente lite awards that the appeal too often is pursued for the purpose of delay rather than to
accelerate determination of the parties' rights. The avoidance of deprivation due to delay is one of the
purposes for the rule that interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable. The fact that appeals
of pendente lite orders often are used as delay tactics weighs in favor of reconsidering Peeler, insofar as
it recognized a right of immediate appeal of an order to pay alimony pendente lite and attorney fees
pendente lite, and concluding that that part of the Pee/er decision has outlived its usefulness. As stated
by our Supreme Court in Veazey v. [City of] Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E.2d 377 (1949), "'[t]here is
no more effective way to procrastinate the administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an
appellate court piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from intermediate orders." Id. at
363.
Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. at 251-52, 285 S.E.2d at 282 (1981).
113. 44 N.C. App. 381, 261 S.E.2d 491 (1980).
114. 29 N.C. App. 509, 224 S.E.2d 656, dscreionary review denied 290 N.C. 667, 228 S.E.2d 458 (1976).
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K. Injunctions' 15
Interlocutory orders concerning injunctions have been held not appealable in
the following circumstances:' 16
In State ex rel Edmisten v. Fayetteviile Street Christian School 1 ' a preliminary
injunction restraining the defendants from operating day-care centers without
complying with state licensing requirements did not affect a substantial right since
it merely ensured the continuance of previous compliance pending final disposi-
tion on the merits. The defendants' claim that the injunction threatened them
with loss of their substantial right of religious freedom did not render the injunc-
tion immediately appealable, since that was the heart of the legal issue to be
decided.
In GLYK Associates v. Winston-Salem Southbound Railway1 8 the plaintiff and its
tenants were restrained from going upon certain lands to which the defendant
claimed record title, but the record on appeal contained no evidence in support of
the plaintiffs allegations that the injunction deprived it and its tenants of access to
its building. The plaintiff thus failed to show deprivation of a substantial right.
The plaintiff was, however, allowed to proceed in superior court "to protect its
rights, if any, from any inequitable adverse effects of the preliminary
injunction."'19
In Setzer v. Annas120 a preliminary injunction restrained the defendant from
obstructing the plaintiffs' lawful right by easement to ingress and egress across the
existing roadway on the defendant's property. The plaintiffs claimed that the
defendant had severely hindered them in their use of the roadway by erecting two
gates across it. The court of appeals dismissed for lack of a substantial right,
115. The supreme court reviewed interlocutory orders involving injunctions without raising the issue
of appealability in the following cases: North Carolina Milk Comm'n v. National Food Stores, 270 N.C.
323, 154 S.E.2d 548 (1967) (continuance of preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from selling milk
"below cost" within meaning of statute); Western Conference of Original Free Will Baptists v. Creech &
Teasley, 256 N.C. 128, 123 S.E.2d 619 (1962) (temporary restraining order restraining defendant Creech
from holding himself out as a minister of certain church or performing any ministerial functions); First
Presbyterian Church v. St. Andrews Presbyterian College, Inc., 254 N.C. 717, 119 S.E.2d 867 (1961) (order
enjoining defendant from interfering with control of college pending determination of control of plaintiff
church); Little Pep Delmonico Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 252 N.C. 324, 113 S.E.2d 422 (1960)
(order prohibiting enforcement of ordinance by requiring removal of existing business signs over
sidewalks); Davenport v. Board of Educ., 183 N.C. 570, 112 S.E. 246 (1922) (refusal to continue order
restraining defendant from using tax monies from plaintiff's school tax district for a school in adjoining
district; court cautioned against interfering with acts of local school authorities).
116. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Pritchard v. Baxter, 108 N.C. 129, 12 S.E. 906
(1891) (order dissolving a restraining order in pending action not appealable where subsequent to issuance
of injunction final judgment on all issues had been rendered against appellant, therefore eliminating
ground for injunction); Childs v. Martin, 68 N.C. 307, 308 (1873) (per curiam) (refusal to vacate order
restraining defendants from further proceedings in mortgage foreclosure pending hearing not appealable
because not a "determination, which affects in whole or in part the legal or actual merits of the contro-
versy"); Smith's Cycles, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 26 N.C. App. 76, 214 S.E.2d 785 (1975) (order
expressing an "opinion" that defendant should be enjoined not appealable because no injunction actually
ordered).
117. 299 N.C. 351, 261 S.E.2d 908, aJdnrehearng299N.C.731265S.E.2d387,appeal dtsmssed,449
U.S. 807 (1980).
118. 55 N.C. App. 165, 285 S.E.2d 277 (1981).
119. Id at 171, 285 S.E.2d at 281.
120. 21 N.C. App. 632, 205 S.E.2d 553 (1974), rev'd, 286 N.C. 534, 212 S.E.2d 154 (1975).
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saying that "under such circumstances impairment of any right of defendant must
be deemed de miniatms.' 12 1
The supreme court, without explicitly addressing the appealability issue,
reversed, reviewed the merits, and vacated the injunction. It held, however, that
the preliminary injunction was issued under a misapprehension of the applicable
law, since the trial court presumed that the plaintiffs had an unqualified right to
use the route across the defendant's property without obstruction by gates placed
by the defendant, and without consideration of the defendant's legal right to
maintain the gates. It stated:
A preliminary injunction should not be granted if a serious question exists in respect of the
defendant's right to do what the plaintiffs seek to restrain and the granting thereof would
work greater injury to the defendant than is reasonably necessary for the protection pendenle
hie of the plaintiffs' rights. Where a serious question exists the hearing judge considers the
relative conveniences and inconveniences of the parties in determining the propriety of a
preliminary injunction and the terms thereof if granted.12 2
Presumably the defendant's legal right to erect and maintain gates which do not
unreasonably interfere with the plaintiffs' right to use the existing roadway 23 con-
stituted a substantial right which rendered the injunction appealable.
An order denying a preliminary injunction to restrain defendants from holding
a meeting in violation of an open meetings law and requiring advance notice of
meetings to the public and media has also been held not to affect a substantial
right. 124
Where the defendants were restrained from blocking a road on their land
which the plaintiffs crossed to gain access to their own property, the court in Prult,
v. W illiams125 found no evidence of potential loss of a substantial right.
Finally, in Dixon v. D/xon'126 no substantial right was affected where the
defendant was ordered to return removed property to the former marital home.
Both parties were enjoined from harming, disposing of, or encumbering any per-
sonal property involved in the divorce suit, and the plaintiff, who resided in the
former marital home, was required to post a security bond.
The following orders involving preliminary injunctions were held to affect a
substantial right:' 27 a mandatory injunction ordering the defendants to remove
without delay concrete anchors on the plaintiff's submerged lands; 28 a mandatory
injunction ordering the defendant to remove a roadway it had graded, allegedly
121. Id. at 634, 205 S.E.2d at 555. One judge dissented, arguing that a substantial right was affected
by the lengthy denial to defendant of the use of his property, without indicating any proposed use by
defendant incompatible with plaintiffs easement.
122. Seizer, 286 N.C. at 540, 212 S.E.2d at 157-58 (citations omitted). The court remanded for a de
novo hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction in light of the stated guidelines.
123. Id at 539, 212 S.E.2d at 157.
124. Gunkel v. Kimbrell, 29 N.C. App. 586, 225 S.E.2d 127 (1976).
125. 288 N.C. 368, 218 S.E.2d 348 (1975).
126. 62 N.C. App. 744, 303 S.E.2d 606 (1983).
127. In addition to the cases mentioned in the text, see First Nat'l Bank v. Jenkins, 64 N.C. 719, 722
(1870) (denial of injunction appealable where trial judge said order "puts an end to the case").
128. Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. James, 300 N.C. 631, 268 S.E.2d 205 (1980).
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by trespass on the plaintiffs' lands;' 29 a temporary injunction restraining defend-
ants from using the name "Moravian" in connection with any church activity;
130
an order continuing a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from
declaring an allegedly illegal election result and from levying taxes, pending deter-
mination of the cause to test the validity of an election to establish a school dis-
trict;1 3 ' an order continuing a preliminary order restraining the defendants from
negotiating promissory notes held by them;13 2 an order restraining the defend-
ants-the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and the Board of Trans-
portation-from removing the plaintiff's outdoor advertising sign for statutory
violations; 33 an order enjoining the defendant from competing with the plaintiff
by either engaging in the same business or providing any entity with information
regarding the plaintiffs business, in accordance with the terms of a covenant not to
compete; 34 an order continuing an order restraining the defendant from doing
business with persons who were customers, brokers, suppliers, or sales representa-
tives of the plaintiff before a certain date, in accordance with the terms of a cove-
nant not to compete; 135 and an order continuing a temporary order restraining
city aldermen from taking any action at any meeting upon two ordinances
granting television cable franchises without considering certain factors.'
36
L. Motions to Strike
As a general rule, there is no right to appeal from the denial of a motion to
strike.' 37 The grant of a motion to strike, where it does not effectively determine
129. English v. Holden Beach Realty Corp., 41 N.C. App. 1, 254 S.E.2d 223, dscrelonary review denied,
297 N.C. 609, 257 S.E.2d 217 (1979).
130. Board of Provincial Elders of the Moravian Church v. Jones, 273 N.C. 174, 180-81, 159 S.E.2d
545, 550 (1968) (Plaintiff claimed use of the name by defendant pending trial would do "irreparable injury
because this name is of great value to a religious body." The court, however, stated that "[the plaintiff is
in a poor position to contend, as it does in its motion to dismiss, that a denial to the defendants of the use of
this name, during this same period, is of no substantial importance to the defendants.").
131. Gill v. Board of Comm'rs, 160 N.C. 176, 76 S.E. 203 (1912) (also noting that because final relief
sought was permanent injunction, court had whole issue before it for decision).
132. Warlick v. H.P. Reynolds & Co., 151 N.C. 606, 612-13, 66 S.E. 657, 660 (1910) (also noting that
defendant's motion to dismiss and to dissolve the restraining order was "jurisdictional in nature," and as
such its denial would ordinarily not be appealable; see supra text accompanying notes 24-35).
133. Freeland v. Greene, 33 N.C. App. 537, 540, 235 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1977) (continuance of injunc-
tion "adversely affect[s] important rights of [defendants] in connection with the performance by them of
duties imposed" by statute).
134. Forrest Paschal Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 27 N.C. App. 678, 220 S.E.2d 190 (1975).
135. Seaboard Indus., Inc. v. Blair, 10 N.C. App. 323, 178 S.E.2d 781 (1971).
136. Cablevision of Winston-Salem, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 3 N.C. App. 252, 257, 164 S.E.2d
737, 740 (1968) (where plaintiff alleged defendant city failed to consider franchisees' qualifications to con-
struct, operate, and maintain a CATV system and whether franchise would be in public interest, "the
order appealed from restrained the governing body of the City of Winston-Salem from exercising its legisla-
tive function in dealing with a matter of large public interest to the citizens of that City.").
137. E.g., Privette v. Privette, 230 N.C. 52, 51 S.E.2d 925 (1949) (motion to strike allegations in
motion to vacate a decree of confirmation of sale of lands, the deed executed pursuant thereto, and several
interlocutory orders; no substantial right was imperiled by denial of motion to strike).
An exception to the rule of nonappealability was noted in dictum by the Privette court. Citing no
authority, the court stated that it had previously entertained appeals from orders denying motions to strike
allegations in pleadings. It stated further that
[t]he pleadings in a cause raise issues of fact to be decided by a jury, chart the course of the trial and,
in large measure, determine the competency of evidence. They are to be read to the jury. If they
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the outcome, 38 is also generally not immediately appealable.139
M. Partition
An order denying actual partition and ordering a sale of real property is imme-
diately appealable, for a tenant in common has a right to actual partition unless it
would injure interested parties. 40 Where the defendants' request for a sale was
denied, however, an order appointing commissioners to partition the land was not
immediately appealable. ' 4 1
In Boyce v. Boyce' 4 2 an action for partition of real property held as tenants in
common (originally as tenants by the entirety) was dismissed. Petitioner claimed a
lien on the proceeds from sale of the property due to a deed of trust placed thereon
for respondent's benefit. Petitioner received none of the loan proceeds and did not
intend to make a gift to the respondent. On petitioner's appeal from the dismissal,
the court of appeals held that a substantial right had been affected, but stated:
"[W]e do not believe it will work injury to the petitioner if this is not corrected
before the final judgment."' 43
N. Prior Pending Actions
The refusal to abate an action on the ground of a prior pending action has
been reviewed by the supreme court on immediate appeal without discussion of
appealability. 44 A recent decision by the court of appeals, however, dismissed as
interlocutory an appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss and a plea in abate-
ment on the ground of a prior pending action. The court did not discuss substan-
tial rights.' 45 The appealability of the denial of such motion is unclear under
current law due to uncertainty as to whether the law of abatement retains its
vitality following enactment of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 41'
contain irrelevant or impertinent averments not competent to be shown in evidence, a refusal to strike
might impair or imperil the rights of the adversary party.
id. at 53, 51 S.E.2d at 926.
138. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
139. E.g., Barnes v. Rorie, 14 N.C. App. 751, 189 S.E.2d 529 (1972) (order striking from plaintiffs
replies allegations that insurance company had persuaded defendants to file counterclaims and that
defendant driverhad a reputation for reckless driving and a criminal record, thus suggesting the car owner
was negligent in allowing the defendant to drive, did not affect a substantial right; the court also noted that
no writ of certiorari had been filed pursuant to a rule of appellate practice in effect at that time).
140. E.g., Horne v. Horne, 261 N.C. 688, 690, 136 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1964); Hyman v. Edwards, 217 N.C.
342, 344, 7 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1940) (dictum).
141. Albemarle Steam Navigation Co. v. Worrell, 133 N.C. 93, 45 S.E. 466 (1903).
142. 51 N.C. App. 422, 276 S.E.2d 494 (1981).
143. Id at 423, 276 S.E.2d at 495. One judge dissented, stating that "[i]f Wife prevails in her claim
against Husband, herjudgment will be a secured lien against his undivided interest in the land. The loss of
such security is a loss of a substantial right to which Wife is entitled." Id at 424, 276 S.E.2d at 495 (Hill, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). He further noted that the delay in deciding the proposed distribution of the
proceeds of sale, along with a subsequent appeal, would cost the parties interest plus an increase in taxes
due. For these reasons, he would have reviewed the merits of the appeal. Id.
144. E.g., Pittman v. Pittman, 248 N.C. 738, 104 S.E.2d 880 (1958); McDowell v. Blythe Bros. Co.,
236 N.C. 396, 72 S.E.2d 860 (1952).
145. Myers v. Myers, 61 N.C. App. 748, 301 S.E.2d 522 (1983).
146. Although it has been suggested that N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 7(c) (1983) (abolishing
"pleas") renders useless not only pleas in abatement but also the substantive law of abatement, the elfect of
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0. Reference
An order of compulsory reference, 147 requiring that issues be sent to a referee
for examination and decision or report, which does not affect a substantial right, is
not immediately appealable unless there is a plea in bar which might determine
the entire action. 148 When a plea in bar is overruled or sustained by the trial
court, or the compulsory reference is ordered without determination of the plea,
the party then asserting the plea has the option of appealing immediately or
awaiting final judgment. 149 Presumably a ruling on a plea in bar is thought to
affect a substantial right.15 0
Absent a plea in bar, an order of compulsory reference is immediately appeal-
able only when it affects a substantial right. 15'
In Harrell v. IIarre//t52 an order of compulsory reference was held to affect a
substantial right because it required the defendant to deposit two hundred dollars
for the payment of expenses, and it was reasonable to assume that the cost would
be much greater than two hundred dollars. The supreme court stated: "To
require defendant to defer testing the validity of the order until the reference has
been completed and the costs have been incurred and imposed would substantially
affect his rights and leave him without remedy for recovery of the expenses neces-
Rule 7(c) on pleas in abatement has not been decided by the North Carolina courts. See Gardner v.
Gardner, 294 N.C. 172, 175 n.5., 240 S.E.2d 399, 402 n.5 (1978). Although the Gardner court expressly held
that the court of appeals had not abused its discretion in refusing to grant certiorari, id. at 173, 240 S.E.2d
at 401, thereby declining to establish a right of appeal, the court of appeals later relied on Gardner in treating
an appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of a prior pending action as a motion pursuant to N.C.
GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 13(a) (1983) (compulsory counterclaims), and therefore considered the appeal.
See Atkins v. Nash, 61 N.C. App. 488, 300 S.E.2d 880 (1983).
147. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1, Rule 53(a)(2) (1983).
148. See, e.g., Harrell v. Harrell, 253 N.C. 758, 761, 117 S.E.2d 728, 730-31 (1961): Gaither v.
Albemarle Hosp., Inc., 235 N.C. 431, 441-42, 70 S.E.2d 680, 689 (1952); Parker v. Helms. 231 N.C. 334,
336, 56 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1949); Green Sea Lumber Co. v. Pemberton, 188 N.C. 532, 535, 125 S.E. 119, 121
(1924); Leroy v. Saliba, 182 N.C. 757, 757, 108 S.E. 303, 303 (1921) (per curiam); Royster v. Wright, 118
N.C. 152, 154-55, 24 S.E. 746, 747 (1896).
149. E.g., Reynolds v. Morton, 205 N.C. 491, 493, 171 S.E. 781, 782 (1933); Green Sea Lumber Co. v.
Pemberton, 188 N.C. 532, 535, 125 S.E. 119, 121 (1924); Leroy v. Saliba, 182 N.C. 757, 757, 108 S.E. 303,
303 (1921) (per curiam). In Pritchett v. Greensboro Supply Co., 153 N.C. 344, 345, 69 S.E. 249, 249
(1910), the supreme court stated that waiting until final judgment
is a convenient practice . . . , because if . . . the party who has excepted succeeds finally, by the
decision of the referee or the verdict of the jury, ... the result shows that no appeal was really
necessary to protect his right. He could appeal when the order of reference was made, but was not
bound to do so at that time.
150. SeeJones v. Sugg, 136 N.C. 143, 48 S.E. 575 (1904).
151. See Sutton v. Schonwald, 80 N.C. 20 (1879) (no substantial right affected by order of reference to
ascertain alleged expenditure for support and maintenance of infants, from proceeds of sale of land); see also
Parker v. Helms, 231 N.C. 334, 56 S.E.2d 659 (1949).
In Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 354, 57 S.E.2d 375 (1950), the supreme court held that where
there is no plea in bar the decision whether to compel reference is within the discretion of the trial judge;
therefore, an order refusing reference does not affect a substantial right.
The fact that a ruling on a particular kind of motion is discretionary, however, is not determinative of
whether a substantial right is affected by a ruling on a specific motion. If the court meant to say that when
a substantial right is affected the decision whether to compel reference is necessarily determinable as a
matter of law, because there can, by definition, be no discretion involved in the preservation of a substan-
tial right, its reasoning is not objectionable-but it offers no guidance. It amounts merely to a conclusion,
without discussion of the issue, that no substantial right was involved. See supra note 51.
152. 253 N.C. 758, 117 S.E.2d 728 (1961).
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sarily involved. 1' 53
The court also held the order immediately appealable because compulsory ref-
erence was not proper to determine defendant-husband's approximate income in
response to a motion for alimony pendente lite. The "purpose is to give [plaintiff-
wife] reasonable subsistence pending trial and without delay. . . . It is not con-
templated that the proceeding will be delayed by a slow and costly reference
involving the examination of records in many different locations and in other
States."1 54
It has been held that an order striking a valid order of reference by consent 55
is immediately appealable, because "[ejither party has a right to have the order
carried into effect and complied with by a full report of the referee, and further
action by the court can only be had upon such report."'' 5 6
Once reference has been ordered and all appealable objections thereto have
been resolved, "it must proceed to its proper conclusion, and . . . an appeal will
only lie from a final judgment or one in its nature final."' 5 7 Thus, appeals have
been dismissed from orders denying exceptions to a referee's report before judg-
ment;'58 vacating a referee's report and ordering a new survey;' 59 modifying a
referee's report, making distribution of many of an insolvent corporation's assets,
and then recommitting the report to the referee for additional findings;"60 partially
modifying the referee's report and retaining certain issues for trial;'. 6' and sus-
taining some of the referee's findings while recommitting the report to the referee
to correct other findings.' 62 If a substantial right were affected in any of these
situations, however, immediate appeal of right presumably would lie.
P. Specific Performance
In Atkins v. Beasey' 63 the plaintiff sought specific performance of an agreement
between two defendants for the benefit of the plaintiff, a lot owner complaining of
drainage problems. The agreement stated that if lot owners complained, certain
but not all defendants would pay the cost of correcting the drainage problems.
Two defendants were ordered specifically to perform all acts necessary to provide
proper drainage. The specific performance order was held to affect a substantial
right and thus to be immediately appealable.
In WhaleheadProperties v. Coastland Corp. 164 the defendant's counterclaim for spe-
153. Id at 761-62, 117 S.E.2d at 731.
154. Id at 763, 117 S.E.2d at 732. The court noted that compulsory reference to determine approxi-
mate income preparatory to awarding alimony pendente lite "is contrary to the course and practice of our
courts." Id
155. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1, Rule 53(a)(1) (1983).
156. Stevenson v. Felton, 99 N.C. 58, 61, 5 S.E. 399, 400 (1888).
157. Pritchard v. Panacea Spring Co., 151 N.C. 249, 249-50, 65 S.E. 968, 969 (1909).
158. Bakami Constr. & Eng'g Co. v. Thomas, 230 N.C. 516, 53 S.E.2d 519 (1949) (per curiam).
159. Cox v. Shaw, 243 N.C. 191, 90 S.E.2d 327 (1955).
160. Pritchard v. Panacea Spring Co., 151 N.C. 242, 65 S.E. 968 (1909).
161. Leak v. Covington, 95 N.C. 193 (1886).
162. Jones v. Call, 89 N.C. 188 (1883).
163. 53 N.C. App. 33, 279 S.E.2d 866 (1981).
164. 299 N.C. 270, 261 S.E.2d 899 (1980).
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cific performance of agreements controlling the design of certain property develop-
ments was rejected by the trial court, which established the plaintiffs breach of
contract and delayed a decision on damages until a later trial. The supreme court
heard defendant's appeal from the order rejecting its counterclaim, stating that by
the time a trial on damages could be held and final judgment rendered on the
counterclaim, the plaintiff might have been able to develop the property in viola-
tion of the agreement, and it would no longer be possible to order specific perform-
ance. The defendant then "would be forced to accept the remedy of money
damages, which it argues is not an effective remedy nor the one it seeks." 1"5  A
substantial right of the defendant was thus affected by the order denying specific
performance.
Q. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment regarding all claims and parties to an action is obviously
appealable as a final judgment. An order denying summary judgment or granting
partial summary judgment is interlocutory, however, and is immediately appeal-
able only in the unusual event that a substantial right is affected. 166
North Carolina courts have found substantial rights to be affected by the grant
of partial summary judgments in the following cases: 16 7
In Oestreicher v. American National Stores'68 the plaintiff sued for fraudulent
breach of contract, anticipatory breach, and punitive damages. The plaintiff
appealed the summary judgment entered against him on the claims for punitive
damages and anticipatory breach. The supreme court held that the plaintiff had a
substantial right to have all three causes tried at the same time by the same judge
and jury and that the court of appeals had erred in dismissing the appeal.' 6 9
165. Id. at 277, 261 S.E.2d at 904; see also McRae v. Moore, 29 N.C. App. 507, 224 S.E.2d 696 (1976).
In McRae, the plaintiffs' claim for specific performance of an option contract to purchase a house was
rejected. Because the denial of specific performance did not adjudicate defendants' counterclaim for dam-
ages, the court of appeals held the denial of specific performance was not immediately appealable. There
was no discussion of substantial rights. Because the court relied on Arnold v. Howard, 24 N.C. App. 255,
210 S.E.2d 492 (1974), see supra note 43, McRae should not be considered precedent for the nonappealability
of a denial of specific performance.
166. E.g., Parker Oil Co. v. Smith, 34 N.C. App. 324, 325, 237 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1977) ("Denial of a
motion for summary judgment ordinarily does not affect a substantial right so that appeal may be taken
from the interlocutory order.").
167. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Beck v. American Bankers Life Assurance Co.,
36 N.C. App. 218, 220-21, 243 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1978) (aberrant decision stating that a partial summary
judgment is appealable if it either affects a substantial right or is final as to matters adjudicated therein).
168. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976) (two justices concurred, three concurred in the result, and
one concurred in part and dissented in part).
169. In Oestreicher the court said:
To require [plaintiff] possibly later to try the second cause of action for punitive damages would
involve an indiscriminate use of judicial manpower and be destructive of the rights of both plaintiff
and defendant. Common sense tells us that the same judge and jury that hears the claim on the
alleged fraudulent breach of contract should hear the punitive damage claim based thereon. The
third cause of action alleged an anticipatory breach of contract. This arose from the same lease con-
tract that gave birth to the first and second causes. By the same token, the same judge and jury should
hear the third cause along with the first and second ones, assuming the plaintiffs cause is not subject
to summary judgment.
290 N.C. at 130, 225 S.E.2d at 805.
The court of appeals followed Oestreicher in Briggs v. Mid-State Oil Co., 53 N.C. App. 203, 280 S.E.2d
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In Nasco Equipment Co. v. Mason1 7 0 the plaintiff and a third-party defendant
bank were competing creditors of the defendant. The trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of the bank. The plaintiff had a right of immediate appeal
because the order denied it a jury trial on its claim against the third-party
defendant "and, in effect, determine[d] the claim in favor of the bank." 7 1 This
was because the bank claimed a perfected security interest in property in which
the plaintiff sought either possession or its value. Justice Exum later characterized
the summary judgment in Nasco as "in effect, a final judgment ultimately disposing
of all claims of any practical significance in the case. '1'
7 2
In Wachovia Realty Investments v. Housing, Inc. 173 the trial court entered summary
judgment against the defendant for a specified sum in an action to recover the
balance due on a note, but retained for hearing the determination of the
defendant's claim for a setoff in the same amount. The supreme court found that,
since execution had been entered on the judgment and the clerk had entered an
order declaring the judgment to be a lien on certain funds owed to the defendant,
entry of summary judgment affected a substantial right of the defendant.
Although there were two statutory procedures for staying execution or enforce-
ment of the judgment,1 74 either procedure, even if successful, would require the
defendant to incur substantial expense.1 75
In Whalehead Properties v. Coastland Corp. 176 summary judgment was entered for
the defendants on one of the plaintiffs three claims, a request for a declaratory
judgment that the plaintiffs redesign of development plats complied with agree-
ments it had entered into with the defendants. The supreme court held that the
partial summary judgment
denies plaintiff a trial on the issue of whether plaintiffis redesign of the development of its
Whalehead property complied with the agreements between plaintiff and defendants, and
disposes of plaintiff's causes of action. Thus the order is a final judgment as to all of plain-
tiff's causes of action and affects a substantial right of plaintiff.
1 77
501 (1981), holding that plaintiff had a substantial right to have a claim for fraudulent inducements and
misrepresentations concerning severance pay tried at the same time as a claim for breach of a contract to
provide severance pay. Plaintiff thus had a right of immediate appeal from summary judgment against it
on the fraudulent inducement claim.
170. 291 N.C. 145, 229 S.E.2d 278 (1976).
171. Id. at 148, 229 SE.2d at 281.
172. Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.C. 493, 251 S.E.2d 448 (1979).
The court of appeals followed Nasco in Cunningham v. Brown, 51 N.C. App. 264, 267, 276 S.E.2d 718,
722 (1981), in holding that where plaintiffs husband and wife had joined their claims for injury, and
summary judgment was granted only against plaintiff-wife, "[tlhe order ... denied plaintiff-wife a jury
trial on her claim against defendant and, therefore, affected a substantial right." Cunningham does not
appear consistent with Nasco as interpreted by Justice Exum, since the husband's claim remains, and it is
"of practical significance."
173. 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977).
174. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-269, -289 (1983) (stay of execution upon money judgment, provided
judgment debtor gives bond or makes deposit); id. § IA-I, Rule 62(g) (1983) (authorizing court rendering
judgment to stay enforcement pending outcome of other parts of litigation, upon conditions court deems
necessary to secure benefits of judgment to judgment creditor).
175. The court of appeals followed Wachovia Realty in Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C. App.
162, 265 S.E.2d 240 (1980), holding that a summary judgment for a monetary sum against one of two
defendants affected a substantial right.
176. 299 N.C. 270, 261 S.E.2d 899 (1980).
177. Id at 276, 261 S.E.2d at 903. Plaintiff's first cause of action had been settled by consent, and its
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In Bernick v. Jurden'78 the plaintiff alleged that the conduct of four defendants
caused his injuries. Summary judgment was granted in favor of two of the defend-
ants. The supreme court held that because of the possibility of inconsistent ver-
dicts in separate trials, the summary judgment for fewer than all of the defendants
affected a substantial right of the plaintiff to have the liability of all parties tried
by the same jury. 7 9
The grant of a partial summary judgment was held not to affect a substantial
right in the following cases:
In Tr'yn Industries Inc. v. American Mutual Insurance Co.t 8o summary judgment
was granted for the plaintiff on the issue of liability, with damages reserved for
subsequent trial. The supreme court found that "the most [defendant] will suffer
from being denied an immediate appeal is a trial on the issue of damages"' 8 and
upheld dismissal of the appeal.
second resulted in summary judgment in its favor, with no appeal taken therefrom by defendants. Thus
summary judgment on the third cause in effect disposed of the entire action. The "substantial right"
language in the court's holding on appealability is therefore superfluous and probably not appropriate.
178. 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982).
179. Id at 439, 293 S.E.2d at 408. If the summary judgment were not immediately appealable, then
the first jury could find the two remaining defendants not negligent, and, following reversal of the
summary judgment on appeal, a second jury trying the other two defendants could find that the injuries
were caused solely by the two defendants tried in the first trial. Id.
The court of appeals, citing Oestretcher and Bernick, held, in Swindell v. Overton, 62 N.C. App. 160, 302
S.E.2d 841 (1983), that plaintiffs had a substantial right to have their claims (1) for damages for failure of a
trustee of a deed of trust on plaintiffs' property to fulfill his duties in connection with the foreclosure sale
(2) for the trustee's wrongfully paying attorney fees on behalf of two other defendants as part of the foreclo-
sure costs; (3) for conversion of their crops by another defendant; and (4) against a third defendant for
charging and collecting an unlawful rate of interest, heard by the same judge and jury.
180. 296 N.C. 486, 251 S.E.2d 443 (1979).
181. Id. at 491, 251 S.E.2d at 447; see also Goforth v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 61 N.C. App.
617, 301 S.E.2d 428 (1983) (no appeal of right from summary judgment on liability issue with trial on
damages to follow); Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 60 N.C. App. 275, 300 S.E.2d 230 (1983) (no right of
appeal from summary judgment that sale of stock be rescinded, deferring question of how much of sale
price should be returned to purchaser); cf Richardson v. Southern Express Co., 151 N.C. 60, 65 S.E. 616
(1909); Moore v. Rowland, 150 N.C. 261, 63 S.E. 953 (1909) (jury verdict on liability only, with determina-
tion of damages to follow, not immediately appealable).
In Nichols v. State Employees' Credit Union, 46 N.C. App. 294, 264 S.E.2d 793 (1980), the court of
appeals held that no substantial right was affected by summary judgment for defendant as to some, but not
all, of the forged checks it allegedly negligently paid. It stated:
We believe that the 'substantial right' exception to Rule 54(b) certification has been limited by the
Court to those situations where the substance of an appealing party's claim or defense would be
reduced, or where the appealing party would incur some other direct injury, if the appeal were not
heard prior to entry of a final judgment disposing of all of the claims of all of the parties.
46 N.C. App. at 296, 264 S.E.2d at 795. One judge dissented, arguing that the case should be distinguished
from one in which the whole liability issue is determined, leaving only the determination of damages. He
stated:
I believe an interlocutory order or judgment which affects the merits of a case in such a way that the
final judgment cannot stand if the order is wrong, affects a substantial right and will work injury to
the appealing party if not corrected before an appeal from a final judgment. . . .[I]f the whole ques-
tion of liability is determined adversely to defendant, the defendant can wait until final judgment
before appealing. . . . In the case sub judice, if the partial summary judgment is not corrected before
appeal from the final judgment and the partial summary judgment is reversed on appeal, the final
judgment from which appeal is taken will not stand. I would hold that this makes the partial sum-
mary judgment appealable.
Id. at 297, 264 S.E.2d at 795-96 (Webb, J., dissenting).
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In Green v. Duke Power Co.,' 8 2 a negligence action, summary judgment was
granted for two third-party defendants from whom the original defendant had
sought contribution for their alleged joint liability. The supreme court held that
the original defendant had no right of immediate appeal. Although the defendant
might have to undergo a subsequent trial in his claim against third-party defend-
ants if the summary judgments were reversed on appeal from final judgment, the
court found that no substantial right was affected by that possibility. It stated:
The possible second trial in the instant case would not involve the same issues and therefore
would not warrant immediate appeal. Ordinarily the possibility of undergoing a second
trial affects a substantial right only when the same issues are present in both trials creating
the possibility that a party will be prejudiced by different juries in separate trials rendering
inconsistent verdicts on the same factual issue. 183
The issue in the cause of action for contribution was whether the third-party
defendants violated a duty of care to the plaintiff, whereas the issue in the prin-
cipal case was whether the defendant independently violated an unrelated duty of
care to the plaintiff.18 4
In Jones v. Clark 85 the plaintiff sued for breach of warranty in the sale of a
modular home. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the third-party
defendant, which had inspected and approved the home. The court of appeals
reasoned that the possibility of the third-party defendant inspector's having to
indemnify the defendant-appellant was remote and that if the summary judgment
were upheld, the third-party defendant manufacturer would still be a party and
obligated to indemnify the inspector. The court chose, nevertheless, to decide the
matter on its merits.
In Blue Ridge Sporcycle Co. v. Schroader'8 6 a summary judgment for one of three
defendants was held not to affect a substantial right, since the plaintiff sought
recovery from that defendant only in the event it was unable to recover from the
other two. Therefore, only if the court found no liability on the part of the other
two defendants would the plaintiff need to appeal the summary judgment. 8 7
In Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Murray18 the plaintiff alleged that sums were
owed it by the defendant under one contract, and the defendant alleged that a
third-party defendant was responsible for any liability under a separate contract.
The court held that no substantial right was affected by summary judgment for
the third-party defendant, since the original defendant's liability to the plaintiff
had not been determined, and there was no danger of different juries rendering
inconsistent verdicts.
The denial of a motion for partial or complete summary judgment has never
182. 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982).
183. Id. at 608, 290 S.E.2d at 596.
184. Plaintiff did not allege joint or concurrent negligence.
185. 36 N.C. App. 327, 244 S.E.2d 183 (1978).
186. 53 N.C. App. 354, 280 S.E.2d 799 (1981).
187. The court stated: "[T]hough on its face a final judgment, it is actually a conditional one that
would adversely affect the plaintiffs only if and when it is determined that they cannot recover on their
primary claims." Id at 357, 280 S.E.2d at 801.
188. 61 N.C. App. 569, 300 S.E.2d 888 (1983).
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been held to affect a substantial right in North Carolina.18 9 In Waters v. Qualified
Personnel, Inc.190 the trial court set aside without prejudice a summary judgment
entered on the ground of procedural irregularity. The supreme court held this to
be the equivalent of denying a summary judgment motion and dismissed the
appeal, stating:
All defendant suffers by its inability to appeal . . . [the] order is the necessity of rehearing
its motion. The avoidance of such a hearing is not a "substantial right" entitling defendant
to an immediate appeal. Neither, for that matter, is the avoidance of trial which defendant
might have to undergo should its motion and plaintiffs motion for summary judgment...
both be denied. 9 '
The court reasoned that the trial court and the parties could develop the facts
more fully and clarify the merits of the claim by waiting to appeal from the final
judgment, thus giving the appellate courts a more complete factual and legal
picture. 192
R. Venue
A ruling on a motion for change of venue as a matter of right (that is, pursuant
to a statute mandating venue) is immediately appealable. 193 The denial of a
change of venue for the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice is not
immediately appealable. '94
S. Miscellaneous
Other types of interlocutory orders, not fitting within the above categories,
have been held appealable of right because they affect substantial rights.
An order allowing the sheriff to open the defendant's safe and inventory its
contents, with or without the defendant's cooperation, was appealable where the
complaint alleged a public nuisance because materials for the manufacture of
whiskey were secreted upon the defendant's premises and where sheriff's affidavits
189. The following cases found no substantial right affected by denial of a motion for summary judg-
ment: Shoffner Indus., Inc. v. W.B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 42 N.C. App. 259, 257 S.E.2d 50 (court chose to
review merits despite nonappealability), dzscretionary review denied, 298 N.C. 296, 259 S.E.2d 301 (1979); Hill
v. Smith, 38 N.C. App. 625, 248 S.E.2d 455 (1978) (denial of both parties' motions for summary judgment
in action for summary ejectment of defendant, allegedly in unlawful possession of plaintiffs' real property);
Funderburk v. Justice, 25 N.C. App. 655, 214 S.E.2d 310 (1975); Motyka v. Nappier, 9 N.C. App. 579, 176
S.E.2d 858 (1970). Dictum in Motyka that denial of summary judgment can be preserved for appeal from
final judgment was expressly disavowed in Parker Oil Co. v. Smith, 34 N.C. App. 324, 325, 237 S.E.2d 882,
883 (1977).
190. 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
191. Id at 208, 240 S.E.2d at 344.
192. Id. at 209, 240 S.E.2d at 344.
193. Coats v. Sampson County Mem. Hosp., 264 N.C. 332, 141 S.E.2d 490 (1965) (motion pursuant to
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-77(2) (1983), mandating venue in action against public officer, subject to court's
power to change venue); Klass v. Hayes, 29 N.C. App. 658, 225 S.E.2d 612 (1976) (motion pursuant to
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-76(4) (1983), mandating venue for actions solely or primarily demanding recovery of
personal property, subject to power of court to change venue); cf State ex. ret. Edmisten v. Fayetteville St.
Christian School, 299 N.C. 351, 261 S.E.2d 908 (tentative denial of change of venue not immediately appeal-
able), aftdon rehearing, 299 N.C. 731, 265 S.E.2d 387, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 807 (1980).
194. Furches v. Moore, 48 N.C. App. 430, 269 S.E.2d 635 (1980) (motion pursuant to N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-83(2) (1983), permitting judge to change venue "[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the
ends of justice would be promoted by the change").
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indicated that no whiskey was found within the safe when it was opened during a
recent prior search.19 5 A substantial right was affected "in that [the order] delves
into [defendant's] private property without legal process."' 96
The denial of a motion for a jury trial in an action for termination of parental
rights has been held to be appealable.197
An order requiring petitioner to make an election of remedies, in an action to
establish disputed boundary lines between adjacent lands, was held appealable
where the petitioner's contentions that either (1) the boundary lines he asserted
were true, or (2) another line asserted in an amendment to the complaint had
become true by adverse possession, were not inconsistent remedies requiring an
election. 198
An order purporting to allow the plaintiff to reinstate a cause of action fol-
lowing a final judgment dismissing the action and to allow further amendment of
the complaint affected a substantial right and was appealable. 99
Finally, in Roberts v. Heffher2°° the trial court entered a judgment that, because
the defendants had never been licensed as general contractors, they were not enti-
tled to assert counterclaims for breach of contract relating to the construction of a
dwelling. They could, however, assert such counterclaims as a setoff to the plain-
tiff's claim. The court of appeals held that the defendants' substantial right to
recover on claims based on the contract was affected. If the defendants were not
allowed an immediate appeal, they would have to undergo a full trial on the
merits and, if the jury found against the plaintiffs, the defendants' counterclaims
would not be reached. On the other hand, if the jury found for the plaintiffs, the
defendants' setoff would be limited to the jury's award. In either case, the defend-
ants would probably have to undergo a second full trial on the merits to recover on
their contract-related claims.
Other interlocutory orders have been held not to be immediately appealable
because they did not affect substantial rights. Examples include orders allowing a
motion to file a reply; 21 finding the defendants entitled to have a factual issue of a
boundary line's location submitted to the jury in a processioning proceeding; 20 2
denying collateral attack on a judgment in a prior action to set aside a deed;20 3
continuing a hearing pending appellate review of a judgment entered by another
judge;20 4 continuing a receiver's motion that its report be considered immediately
and reserving complete consideration of the report;20 5 continuing a motion to
amend a schedule;20 6 remanding an action for a special use permit to the city
195. State cx. re. Hooks v. Flowers, 247 N.C. 558, 101 S.E.2d 320 (1958).
196. Id. at 562, 101 S.E.2d at 323.
197. In re Ferguson, 50 N.C. App. 681, 274 S.E.2d 879 (1981).
198. Jenkins v. Trantham, 244 N.C. 422, 94 S.E.2d 311 (1956).
199. Mills v. Richardson, 240 N.C. 187, 81 S.E.2d 409 (1954).
200. 51 N.C. App. 646, 277 S.E.2d 446 (1981).
201. Funderburk v. Justice, 25 N.C. App. 655, 214 S.E.2d 310 (1975).
202. Martin v. Flippen, 101 N.C. 452, 8 S.E. 345 (1888).
203. Gardner v. Price, 239 N.C. 651, 80 S.E.2d 478 (1954).
204. Fryar v. Gauldin, 259 N.C. 391, 130 S.E.2d 689 (1963).
205. Corporation Comm'n v. Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 183 N.C. 170, 110 S.E. 839 (1922).
206. Brown & Co. v. Nimocks, 126 N.C. 808, 36 S.E. 278 (1900).
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council for a de novo hearing;20 7 affirming an order of seizure of a mobile home by
the clerk in a claim and delivery proceeding ancillary to an action to recover
money due on a note for the purchase price of the mobile home; 20 8 refusing to sign
a judgment tendered by the plaintiff;20 9 staying arbitration; 2 10 staying the collec-
tion of costs of depositions taken by defendants until the termination of a subse-
quent action which the plaintiffs expressed an intent to commence; 2 1I directing a
trial by jury;2 12 requiring a party to show cause why a receiver should not
be appointed;21 3 appointing commissioners to assess damages caused by the
defendant's construction of a railroad across the plaintiff's land; 2 4 refusing to
cancel notice of lispendens regarding land which the plaintiff alleged the defendant
had wrongfully refused to sell; 21 5 limiting the scope of lispendens notices to acreage
to which the plaintiffs claimed title in an action to quiet title;2 1 6 refusing to compel
restitution of sums disbursed from the defendant's property sale in execution of a
prior summary judgment; 21 7 determining the scope of review for an administrative
hearing involving a contested hazardous waste treatment facility; 2 18 denying a
motion for nonsuit at the close of all the evidence;219 and refusing to set aside a
jury verdict, except regarding one issue. 220
VIII
CONCLUSION
Greater certainty concerning appealability is laudable if the objective is a
coherent, predictable, uniform review process. Experience indicates, however, that
in North Carolina such a goal may be difficult, if not impossible, to attain.
As noted above, over one hundred years ago the supreme court observed that
no rule had been settled classifying cases in terms of loss of or prejudice to a sub-
207. Jennewein v. City Council, 46 N.C. App. 324, 264 S.E.2d 802 (1980).
208. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith, 24 N.C. App. 133, 210 S.E.2d 212 (1974), cerl. denied, 286
N.C. 420, 211 S.E.2d 801 (1975). Defendants claimed their substantial right justifiably to revoke accept-
ance of the mobile home, and their allegedly valid security interest therein, were adversely affected. The
court held that the questions raised by defendants "can be decided only when the case is heard on its
merits. No substantial right of the defendants has yet been judicially determined. Furthermore, whatever
interest the defendants have in the mobile home is amply protected by plaintiffs undertaking filed in the
claim and delivery proceeding pursuant to G.S. 1-475." 24 N.C. App. at 135, 210 S.E.2d at 213.
209. Brown & Co. v. Nimocks, 126 N.C. 808, 36 S.E. 278 (1900).
210. Peloquin Assocs. v. Polarco, 61 N.C. App. 345, 300 S.E.2d 477 (1983).
211. Bell v. Moore, 31 N.C. App. 386, 229 S.E.2d 235 (1976).
212. Goode v. Rogers, 126 N.C. 62, 35 S.E. 185 (1900).
213. Gray v. Gaither, 71 N.C. 55 (1874).
214. Hendrick v. Carolina Cent. R.R., 98 N.C. 431, 4 S.E. 184 (1887).
215. Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979) (dictum that ifdefendant
wanted to sell land or use it as loan collateral, then he might be deprived of a substantial right by the hs
pendens).
216. Whyburn v. Norwood, 37 N.C. App. 610, 246 S.E.2d 540 (1978).
217. Harris v. Jim Stacy Racing, Inc., 53 N.C. App. 597, 281 S.E.2d 455, dscretionagy review denied, 304
N.C. 726, 287 S.E.2d 900 (1981).
218. Blackwelder v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983) (due
to the order, the state reversed its earlier position and refused to defend issuance of a permit to defendant;
defendant claimed it had a substantial right to have the state defend issuance of the permit).
219. Cowart v. Honeycutt, 257 N.C. 136, 125 S.E.2d 381 (1962).
220. Thomas v. Carteret County, 180 N.C. 109, 104 S.E. 75 (1920).
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stantial right, absent interlocutory appeal. 22 1 Only six years ago that court was
still noting the usual necessity of considering the particular facts of each case and
the procedural context of the order from which appeal is sought.
222
In light of this history, skepticism as to prospects for substantial reform is
appropriate. Regardless of statutory changes designed to promote predictability,
the North Carolina appellate courts can probably be expected to gloss the reforms
by interlocutory intervention in trial proceedings as they, in their discretion, deem
appropriate to promote substantial justice or judicial economy. While undesirable
when measured by the criterion of certainty, this relative nonsystem, which cur-
rently prevails and will likely continue, serves the countervailing value of flexible
and equitable or economical disposition of individual cases.
221. Jones v. Call, 89 N.C. 188, 190 (1883) (per curiam); see supra text accompanying note 47.
222. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978); see supra text
accompanying note 48.
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